

**Protecting architectural heritage in post-communistic cities
from commercial-oriented real estate development
through community engagement**

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*Analysing constraints and opportunities of actions of
collectiveness and solidarity by the case study of Save Kvity Ukrainy*

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Statement of the authenticity of the material

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any institution and to the best of my knowledge, and belief, the research contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text of the thesis.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Anastasiia Zhuravel', is written above a horizontal line.

(Anastasiia Zhuravel)

Berlin, 19th January 2022

Abstract – It is an often-observed phenomenon in many cities worldwide that people in their role as citizens do not actively participate in their community, even there are not satisfied with the situation at many levels. In this case, Ukraine is no exception to this. However, as everywhere, in Ukraine this problem has its own contextual background and history. The transformation from a communistic regime since 1991 into a democracy and the connected developments caused erosion of trust in politics, economy, and society among many people.

Still, though it can be hypothesized that a significant share of Ukrainian citizens can be characterized as belonging to the group of inactive citizens, there is another very active part of society. This part tries by various actions to improve the situation collectively at the place in its immediate urban environment, e.g., through the preservation of urban landscape and architectural heritage. Many of them are in a constant confrontation with an unleashed and corrupt real estate sector. One outstanding example for such collective actions and movements is *Save Kvity Ukrainy*.

By analysing the case example of *Kvity Ukrainy* in its dynamic environment of like-minded collective actions and movements, the thesis' tries to contribute to the understanding: what are the reasons underlying the hypothesized difficulties to encourage community members for bottom-up collective actions in post-communist Kyiv?

The methodological design of the research integrates Pierre's (2014) urban governance concept with Sýkora and Bouzarovski's (2012) concept on post-communist urban transformation into the context of the problem collective action as outlined by Silver et al. (2010) and Rydin and Pennington (2000). The theoretical foundation is then applied to the desktop and empirical research on the case study of *Save Kvity Ukrainy* and beyond to minor examples of related collective movements in Kyiv. For the empirical part, interviews were conducted with stakeholders involved in the case study at the place, including the activists founding the *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, experts familiar with the situation (e.g., scholars, architects, journalists, citizens), and political actors (e.g., city administration).

In the end, the present thesis wants to contribute to depicting a diverse landscape of collective actions and movements in Kyiv, aiming at the preservation of urban and architectural heritage since the beginning of this century. An outcome that can be considered very valuable for further potential research.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ECE Eastern and Central Europe
- KCC Kyiv City Council
- KCSA Kyiv City State Administration
- KDCC Kyiv of Construction Control
- KGP Kyiv General Plan
(officially General Plan of Kyiv City)
- NGO Non-governmental organisation
- NIMBY Not-in-my-backyard-movement
- MoP Member of Parliament of the Verkhovna Rada
- USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

GLOSSARY

- Euromaidan (Alternatively 'Revolution of Dignity') Demonstrations, protests and civil unrest in Ukraine between 21 November 2013 to 23 February 2014, ultimately leading to the resignation of President Victor Yanukovich and his government.
- Gilded Age Historical era in the United States of America, lasting from the 1870s to about 1900, characterized by a rapid economic growth and industrialization, labour force immigration from Europe and East-Asia, but also growing socio-economic inequalities.
- Oblast Federal states in Ukraine.
- Raion Local administrative unit below the Oblast level.
- Reyderstvo Illegal capturing of state companies and property or private businesses, characteristic for post-Soviet states.
- Verkhovna Rada The unicameral parliament of Ukraine.

1. Introduction

Worldwide, it is an often-observed phenomenon that in many cities, people in their role as citizens do not actively participate in their community, even if they are not satisfied with the status quo in their environment at many levels (see e.g., Silver et al. 2010; Rydin and Pennington 2000). Or as Bachrach and Baratz aptly put it already in 1975 (p. 903):

“Those who most need to participate in the political process are the nonparticipants.”

In a given community where the politico- and socio-economic as well as environmental situation is problematic, this does not only impose a challenge and problem to those actors who want to improve the situation actively, such as NGOs (non-governmental organisations) or motivated local politicians and entrepreneurs. Much more, it also affects the inactive citizens themselves. In this way, their public apathy towards their community and socio-economic environment induces a vicious cycle where, at best, the situation stays the same but often becomes even worse.

In this case, Ukraine is no exception to this. But as everywhere, in Ukraine this problem has its own contextual background and history. The transformation from a communistic regime since 1991 into a democracy and the connected developments caused erosion of trust in politics, economy and society among many people. Until today, in Ukraine this history of transformation has had a significant impact on the post-Soviet society and environment, including urban landscapes¹, and is a big reason for the public apathy of citizens. For instance, some of these citizens may have merely the time to engage themselves in their urban setting actively as due to economic pressure they work in several jobs to sustain their livelihoods (cf. Cybriwsky 2016, p. 292). But others may be simply not aware of the existing opportunities to shape their surrounding urban landscape in their own favour despite limited economic means, for example, through the participation in collective actions of solidarity.

¹ Author's note: Falling back on several terms such as 'architectural heritage' 'urban landscape', 'urban environment', 'urban space' or 'urban setting', in the present thesis in their meaning they all follow Landorf's (2019) inclusive definition of the 'urban historic cultural landscape' (Landorf 2019, pp. 79–80) based on Taylor (2015, p. 184). According to this, the urban historic cultural landscape is a 'dynamic' space, featuring visible and non-visible characteristics to which its citizens are not only exposed to, but about which they also feel and think of. In this way, urban historic cultural landscapes consist of both, specific architectural artefacts and "[...] symbolic meanings, sociocultural values, behaviours, and traditions that give rise to a collective local identity" (Landorf 2019, p. 80) inherited from several generations. For the present this broader conceptualization of urban spaces seems most appropriate as it acknowledges "[...] the social sustainability principles of equity, participation, inclusion, diversity, and sense of place." (Landorf 2019, p. 80)

It can be assumed that a significant share of the Ukrainian society can be characterized as belonging to the group described above (cf. Cybriwsky 2016, p. 292). But in the aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity it is often said that a new type of active citizen has emerged, full of energy to claim back its city (see e.g., Ponomorova et al. 2020, cf. Cybriwsky 2016, p. 292). These citizens often improve the situation in its immediate urban setting through various forms of engagement, among them collective actions. Two recent and outstanding examples for such collective actions in Kyiv are *Save Kvity Ukrainy*² (*Квиму України*) and *Savekyivmodernism*. Both of them seeking to save objects of endangered objects of Soviet modernism architecture. In Kyiv's highly un- respectively overregulated – depending on one's perspective – and corrupt real estate sector this is challenging as many of these buildings are built on the ground of high commercial value. This makes them a coveted object of real estate developers under constant threat. For them, it is often a lucrative business to tear off the buildings and successively replace them with new projects of commercial purpose but of low common value for the city's society. Typically, these are shopping malls or office buildings (cf. e.g., Cybriwsky 2016).

Save Kvity Ukrainy began in summer 2021 as a bottom-up citizen movement, collectively founded by experts and non-experts, to protect the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion in their neighbourhood. The pavilion is an outstanding example of Soviet modernist architecture in the city. The collective actions of *Save Kvity Ukrainy* originally comprised initially of demonstrations and concerts on the ground of the building, then already covered by a construction site and foreseen for demolition. Not ending with these actions, in the course of the events, the *Save Kvity Ukrainy* movement began to undergo a still ongoing transformation, typical for many collective actions (cf. Silver et al. 2010). This makes *Save Kvity Ukrainy* an object of outstanding interest and value for empirical research on specific aspects of collective actions under laboratory conditions.

Taking up these developments, contextualizing the case study of *Kvity Ukrainy* within the assumed specifics of post-communist³ transformation, the thesis' objective is on understanding:

Which context-specific causes underlie the hypothesized constraints to encourage community members for collective solidarity actions in Kyiv?

² Author's note: Unless otherwise stated by the individuals themselves, e.g., as proper names, own designations or authors of specialist literature, in the transliteration of names of actors, geographical places etc. from Cyrillic Ukrainian into Romanized Ukrainian, I will follow the official Ukrainian systematisation.

³ Author's note: In the present work, the term 'post-communist' will be used rather than 'post-socialist'. In this, the author will follow the explanation by Sýkora and Bouzarovski (2012) after which the term post-communist is more suitable to describe the reality in countries which aimed at building a socialist utopia. In fact, these countries "[...] were ruled by [an] communist ideology exercised by communist [elites] [...]" with a distinct impact on the organisation of society and the daily lives of the citizens." (Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012, p. 54)

Drawing from the empirical research findings, in a second step, potential entry points for approaches to overcome the constraints are. Thereby, the present thesis contributes to an academically disputed issue by focussing on a type of urban setting clearly distinguishable from others by cultural, socio- and politico-economic attributes. Namely: The opportunities collective and solidarity actions might offer and how promising they are in practice (see e.g., Silver et al. 2010; Taylor 2007; Swyngedouw 2005) the of protection of architectural heritages⁴ in post-communist cities. This is of particular interest as there is a vast literature about the people's 'right to the city' and the role of citizen participation in it with regard to cities in the Northern and Western hemisphere, but comparatively little on cities in post-communist countries (cf. e.g., Lees 2012; Brenner et al. 2012; Taylor 2007; Jouve 2005).

The methodological design of the thesis consists of two parts: a theoretical foundation and a second part of empirical research, which builds upon the theoretical conceptualization. For the theoretical foundation, Sýkora and Bouzarovski's (2012) concept on post-communist urban transformation is merged with Pierre's (2014) urban governance framework, which serves as a tool to analyse the interaction of different actors at different levels in urban spaces. This is necessary as Pierre's (2014) more general urban governance framework alone does not sufficiently take into account the specifics of post-communist urban landscapes. Integrating both concepts against the background of the 'collective action problem' as outlined by Silver et al. (2010) and Rydin and Pennington (2000), it provides the necessary methodological instruments.

The theoretical foundation is then applied to the desktop literature and empirical research on the case study of *Kvity Ukrainy*. For the empirical part, remote interviews, following semi-structured guidelines, with two main stakeholder groups were conducted: The first group I define as those stakeholders either immediately involved in the case study or being experts, familiar with the situation in the field of civic engagement in the field of architectural heritage in Kyiv or the cities real estate sector. This group consists of members with different personal and professional backgrounds like scholars, architects, journalists, developers and investors, as well as political actors. The second main stakeholder group constitutes a large part of inactive citizens who should profit from collective and solidarity action but is often failed to motivate and integrate for participation. The empirical research is completed desktop research. Besides scientific literature, this includes the study of grey literature (e.g., governmental urban development strategies) sources of digital media and communication. This latter includes videos and call for actions publicized by the actors of civil engagement via, for example, official media, blogs, or social networks.

⁴ Author's note: Following Smith's (2006, p. 59) approach, in the present work the term 'heritage' is defined inclusively as spatial objects have not only visible attributes, but also possess subjective collective and individual experiences, interpretations as well as self-ascriptions, decisive for the development of identities.

My personal motivation for the research project outlined above is of twofold nature: Firstly, as a citizen I lived in Kyiv's central Shevchenkivskyi Raion, not far away from the Kvity Ukrainy building. As a resident of this neighbourhood, I have personally witnessed the destruction of a market hall steaming from the Czarist time in my backyard in favour of an upper-class apartment and office complex. Also, the imminent dismantling of a park in my street made me attend several citizen meetings to counsel how this can be prevented. So, in short: I am myself a citizen affected by the uncontrolled real-estate sector in Kyiv.

Even more decisive for me is my professional background. During my five years as project coordinator in the Kyivan-based educational platform in the sphere of architecture and urbanism CANactions, I was personally involved in several projects dealing with collective citizen movements in the urban sphere. Here I have witnessed that despite being of great value for their surrounding urban environments, at some point they often fail to develop themselves further and strive for sustainable outcomes as they fail to gain broader participation. Additionally, in my role as a social entrepreneur and co-founder of an NGO in Kyiv, I try to participate myself in my participative actions with other civil actors to shape Kyiv into an urban landscape, respecting more its citizens' needs. From this point of view, I have also a strong intrinsic motivation in my research.

2. Theoretical framework and conceptualization

Only equipped with suitable methodological tools is it possible to assess the opportunities and limitations of collective actions in the transformation of post-communist urban settings. For this purpose, in this chapter Sýkora and Bouzarovski's (2012) concept on post-communist urban transformation and Pierre's (2014) urban governance framework will be introduced and subsequently applied to analyse participation in collective actions as defined by Silver et al. (2010) and Rydin and Pennington (2000). However, going too deep into all details of existing research on urban governance and civic participation is not expedient, as it would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather those aspects of these theories applying to the analysed case study of *Save Kvity Ukrainy* have to be exemplified and embedded into one framework.

2.1 Actors and interaction in urban governance

It is argued that in many ways, the diversity and number of duties cities have towards their citizens, have become too comprehensive to be fulfilled by the city's institutions alone. Besides the sheer number and diversity of tasks, partial administrative incapability or overload of cities to manage their tasks might be exacerbated by a lack of personnel, financial and economic resources as well as will or legitimation on the national or community level (Pierre 2014, pp. 7–8, cf. Stone 1989, p. 229). To which degree all these possible causes contribute to a city's partial administrative incapability to fulfil its tasks depends on the respective prevalent cultural and historical identities respectively political and socio-economic circumstances on the ground and in the country. For example, in times of an economic crisis, it might be that cities are no longer able to maintain the provision of public services such as libraries or public recreational zones or other crucial infrastructure like public transport (see e.g., Vaiou and Kalandides 2016).

The situation of partial administrative incapability and overload of city authorities has been not only accompanied by processes of decentralization and privatization in various urban spheres. Both have also strengthened each other, creating an increasingly fragmented organizational environment in cities. This fragmented organizational environment gives rise to changing power relations between existing actors at different levels of urban government, and in addition new actors become active. Amongst others, this includes the private economic sector, various interest groups such as business

associations, chambers of commerce, public-private partnerships, and various non-governmental organizations and other social movements (Pierre 2014).

The setting in which these actors communicate with each other in their urban environment to achieve both common and individual goals in collective actions can be described as 'governance' (Pierre 2014, p. 4, 10). Hence, while a variety of different meanings, depending on the respective context, can be attributed to the term governance, in the course of the present research the term is applied in accordance with the concept of urban governance as defined by Pierre (2014) and Stoker (2000): Here, governance as part of urban politics is defined as "[...] a concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to rest on recourse to the authority of the state." (Stoker 2000, p. 93) In this regard, it is important to note that urban governance describes the process of how a city is governed rather than providing any up-front definitions about the concrete location of power as well their distribution among the involved political, economic and civil society actors (Pierre 2014, p. 4, 12, 17.). Depending on his respective background, each actor derives his formative power from various resources like authority, knowledge, financial resources, networks, etc. which he can use "[...] at some cost to the city [...] into the pursuit of collective goals" (Pierre 2014, p. 17).

Coherently, the urban governance concept does not make any presupposition how, if at all, agency, authority, and interactions between the actors are formally defined and arranged (Pierre 2014, p. 16, 11). This conceptual openness makes the framework of urban governance a suitable one to analyse the development, opportunities, and constraints of collective actions in a dynamic urban setting (cf. Pierre 2014, p. 14, 16). For the present research, these are collective actions of civic engagement in Kyiv aiming at the protection of architectural heritage from commercial-oriented real estate development.

In that respect, the concept of urban governance is even more applicable as it not only underlines the limits of political and administrative control and in turn the indispensability of societal engagement for the achievement of collective objectives. Much more, it explicitly recognizes that networks within and between these groups can appear suddenly and are firstly of a collaborative nature, and secondly determined by the setting of the urban environment in which they arise (Pierre 2014, pp. 11–12).

Still, what makes the urban governance concept at least partially insufficient for research on post-communist cities like Kyiv is the fact that it is clearly rooted in the urban settings of the western hemisphere. It claims that authority – meaning the formalized decision right of political actors – and agency – meaning the right to execute these decisions – can and have to be separated between political actors on the one hand, and the remaining actors on the other. This interpretation concedes the agenda-setting and responsibility for accountability to elected officials whereas private economy and the civil society should

support the agenda achievement with their resources and in collective actions in cooperation with the political actors (Pierre 2014, p. 11).

2.2 Urban governance in post-communist urban transformation

Pierre's (2014) idealized notion certainly does not reflect the whole range of urban settings with their diverse historical, cultural well as socio- and politico-economic preconditions. In consequence, for various reasons it hardly corresponds to the reality in many particulars, but not exclusively, post-communist urban societies (cf. e.g., Pierre 2014; Tasan-Kok 2004). In the view of the author, this represents a significant conceptual shortcoming in the urban governance framework for the present research, grounded in its claimed general validity (cf. Sýkora and Bouzarovski, p. 44). To address this shortcoming the present research will complementary fall back on Sýkora and Bouzarovski (2012) and their concept of the multiple transformations of post-communist urban settings and integrate it into the applied urban governance framework.

According to Sýkora and Bouzarovski (2012), while the institutional reforms in a given post-communist country might be completed, most urban settings in these countries are still in the process of transformation, especially with regard to changes in the built environment, land use, and societal conditions.⁵ Thus, since the transition of former socialist countries towards other forms of political and economic systems has begun, legacies from the socialist and communist-era have been undergone and still undergo several socio- and politico-economic transformations, especially at the municipal level.

In this way, Sýkora and Bouzarovski's (2012) conceptual framework for the analysis of social and urban change in post-communist countries acknowledges a trickle-down effect of a general transition on a broader level consisting of several specific small-scale transformations. In doing so, the main transition and the several small scale-transformation processes in urban settings are always interdependent of each other, can timely overlap but can also take place separately (Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012, pp. 44–46, 53, cf. Fig 1.). Sýkora and Bouzarovski (2012, p. 44) emphasize that small-scale transitions of urban change are often of spontaneous nature and connected to emerging social changes which

⁵ Author's note: Although institutional transitions of political systems do not represent the focus of the present research, in the author's opinion it should be noted that since the break apart of the Warsaw Pact, its former member states and the now independent successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) have not taken one congruent development path. Therefore, today they do not represent a homogeneous type of states covering a wide range of different political systems, ranging from authoritarian-led rentier economies like Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, over semi-authoritarian regimes such as Russia to fully developed democratic market economies such as the Baltic States. And for many of them the institutional transition is far from being assessed as completed (cf. e.g., Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 50 – 51; Windwehr 2010).

it is why it is important to understand their key drivers. This assumption is specifically interesting for the present research against the background of a potential correlation between the Revolution of Dignity and movements of collective action and solidarity with the aim to protect Soviet architectural heritage from destruction.




Fig. 1 – The multiple transformation model of post-communistic cities

(Source: Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012, p. 46)

Although the transition and transformation processes have taken different paths in the respective post-communist states of Eastern and Central Europe (ECE), they have in common that their urban settings built up during communism are affected by the new political, economic, and cultural conditions, predetermined by capitalistic norms. In consequence, these urban settings cannot be characterized as pure socialists or communist cities anymore. However, neither is their transformation entirely completed. So, in their urban dynamics, these cities take an intermediate position between the still existing communist historical and cultural legacy and the newly evolving post-communistic socio- and politico-economic regime (Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012, pp. 44–45). In the case of

Ukraine, the latter means a semi-developed post-communistic market economy and democratically elected governments (see e.g., Åslund 2015).

Analysing actions of solidarity and collectiveness with the aim to preserve architectural heritage in Kyiv from commercial-oriented real estate development by applying the urban governance theory within Sýkora and Bouzarovski's (2012) conceptual framework, these actions need to be located within the latter one. Following Sýkora and Bouzarovski (2012), during the first stage of institutional transformations, the privatization of formerly state-owned real estates had probably the most profound effects on the further development of post-communist cities like Kyiv (Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012, p. 48, cf. e.g., Dawidson 2004; Kährik et al. 2003; Kährik 2002, 2000; Bodnár 2001; Korhonen 2001; Häussermann 1996; Eskinasi 1995; Sýkora and Šimoníčková 1994). This reorganization of the urban landscapes then trickles down, and in turn induces far-reaching economic and social impacts at the third and second transition stages. Amongst others, the trickle-down effects comprise the creation of new possibilities including 'new modes of postmodern culture', offering space to the coexistence of different values, often characterized by increasing individualism of different interest groups (Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012, pp. 48–51, cf. Fig 1).

It should be self-evident that these different impacts are not necessarily mutually complementary and can contain the potential for conflict. This is for example likely for the socio-cultural motivated preservation of architectural heritage in opposition to commercial-oriented real estate development (Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012, p. 51, cf. e.g., Kotus 2006; Tsenkova and Nedovic'-Budic' 2006; Sýkora 1999). Accordingly, the here analysed type of solidarity and collective action, a grass-root movement rooted in the civil society engaged in the preservation of urban architectural heritage from economic commercialization, operates at the intersection of the second and third stage of post-communist transitions; namely the social and the urban transformation (cf. Fig. 1). In this context, this research tries to contribute to the answer if collective and solidarity actions in post-communist countries can partially make up for the observed backing off of urban planning authorities in favour of private real estate developers. And further, if it can serve as a kind of counter-measure against clientelism between these two actors (Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012, p. 50, cf. e.g., Horak 2007; Sýkora 2006).

2.3 The problem for collective action in urban governance

Introductory it was hypothesised statement that in communities of any size the people in their role as citizens do not actively participate in participatory, collective and solidarity

actions. This can be also the case if these actions promise a positive impact on their situation and are pro-actively initiated by public institutions respectively at least legitimized by them in any form.

The underlying reason for this, at first glance contractionary, behaviour is described by Rydin and Pennington (2000) as the 'collective action problem'. While Rydin and Pennington (2000) analyse the collective action problem in the context of environmental planning, it is very well present in the urban context as well. Not least because some of the environmental planning issues described by the authors, like urban air pollution, are situated in urban settings. But also, because urban settings are generally characterized by dynamic processes, leaving much room for participative, collective and solidarity actions.

Three of the most prominent core elements ascribed to the collective action problem are 'conflict versus consensus', 'inclusion versus exclusion', and the 'rational ignorance'. How these three elements pertain the success and sustainability of civic engagement in form of participative actions will be outlined below (cf. Silver et al. 2010; Rydin and Pennington 2000).

2.3.1 *The rational ignorance*

Rydin and Pennington (2000), locate the collective action problem partly in the potential absence of sufficient incentives for an individual citizen to participate in collective actions although theoretically enabled with the opportunity (p. 156). May this opportunity have been legitimized by public institutions or *only* provided through yet not institutionalized non-state actors.

The lack of sufficient incentives for individuals causes a 'rational ignorance' (Tullock 1993) towards the opportunity for participating in, and taking, collective action. The partial absence or non-existence of incentives can be induced by several drivers, which have in common that they mostly lead to one and the same conclusion for the person in question: the cost-benefit ratio does not pay off to participate in the collective action. This means, the costs in terms of time, effort and resources for collecting and processing information and building up necessary capacities are considered being too high or uncertain in comparison to the expected outcomes and personal benefit (Rydin and Pennington 2000, p. 159).

Accordingly, against the background of public choice theory, Rydin and Pennington 2000 (p. 159) identify the following probable drivers determining the likelihood of participation in collective actions: 'the costs of participation', 'the direct benefits of participation', 'the costs of non-participation', 'the expected likelihood of participation influencing the [...] outcome', 'the expected distribution of costs and benefits associated with the policy outcome', and 'the level of knowledge of the [...] issue and the [...] process'.

The above-described effect might be reinforced in urban settings where the opportunity for free-riding is present. Therefore, the promise to passively receive the same benefits from a given action of collectiveness and solidarity like the active participants, but without investing the same amount of time and resources (Rydin and Pennington 2000, pp. 157–158). Anyhow, the likelihood to build up more resources through collective and participatory actions remains much higher for residents participating actively in the process than for passive freeriding community members (Silver et al. 2000, p. 455). The possible obstruction of free-riding to the success and sustainability of participative, collective and solidarity actions leads directly to the second, already mentioned one: inclusion versus exclusion.

2.3.2 *Exclusion versus inclusion*

Today, utilization of, debate about and research on the term 'participation' plays a significant role in urban sciences. For many it is connected to democratic empowerment (Silver et al. 2010, p. 452). In this interpretation, actions of solidarity and collectivism often claim for themselves to be progressive grassroot movements, executed in a participatory and inclusionary way leading towards the empowerment of marginalized groups. Still, numerous case studies from a variety of different urban settings around the world show that there is no automatism.

As in any social setting, the internal power configuration is a pivotal factor and key pillar for the inclusiveness of actions of solidarity and collectivism. Complementary, within participative and collective actions, top-down induced or vice versa, hierarchies and power relations are always either transmitted from outside, reconfigured or newly configured (Silver et al. 2010, p. 455). For example, regarding the first scenario, it is known that voluntary participation in collective actions often bases on unintentional selectivity. Meaning that they often consist of members sharing the same values, language. Not uncommon, these members disposing about a privileged educational and socio-economic background. Whereas marginal groups with less access to education, culture and information or time and financial resources lacking entry points. Thus, these movements tend to be homogenous. (Silver et al. 2010, p. 464; Perrin and McFarland 2008, p. 1234; Taylor 2007, p. 302). In this way, disputes might be avoided and the pursuing objectives of a collective agenda might be more efficient, but questions of distributional nature can hardly be solved this way. In conclusion it can be said that participative, collective and solidarity actions do not per se and per definition promote equality and produce empowerment for all participants and target groups (Silver et al. 2010, pp. 455–456). All the more it is of utmost importance to create entry points for participation for marginalized groups, e.g., through the provision of additional resources and capacities.

Additionally, actors active in a given urban setting, might have a high intrinsic motivation influencing their environment by determining the outcome of collective actions in their own interest. This interest might go hand in hand with the interest to intentionally deter other groups from joining the process instead of or together with oneself. This is most likely the case, if these groups allegedly possess contrary intentions and therefore are being perceived as threat or concurrence. Alternatively, they can be considered as needless and simply another fraction with whom the potential positive outcomes have to be shared, leaving less personal gain to every participant. As situational insiders, often active actors have more detailed knowledge and expertise about the setting in which they act. These resources provide them with the means to limit the access for other potential though not yet committed participants. For example, through manipulated information misleading potential participants to the conclusion that the costs of participation do not offset the profit of engagement (Silver et al. 2010, p. 462; Rydin and Pennington 2000, pp. 158–159). And even if such strategies do not lead to a complete exclusion from the scratch, they might be successful in the long term. There is empirical research, giving evidence of where formerly excluded groups were subsequently integrated in participative actions, their contributions remained still ignored (Silver et al. 2010, p. 455; Taylor 2007, p. 310).

Both probabilities outlined above, exclusion – either passive through the unequal distribution of resources itself or active through the utilization of these circumstances – bear the risk of particularistic and elitist civic movements. In its worst form such collective actions can take the form of so-called ‘not-in-my-backyard’-movements’ (NIMBY). NIMBY-movements are characterised by pursuing objectives primarily serving only the interests of a small, often locally based, group and potentially opposing the needs of the wider public (Silver et al. 2010, pp. 454–456, 461–462). This is also why modern states have mostly rejected the idea of an extensive integration of collective and participatory forms of civic governance in political decision-making beyond an advisory and consulting function (Silver et al. 2010, p. 455, cf. e.g., Frug 1999; Magnusson 2005).

But also, where citizen participation is initiated top-down by state authorities, it follows more or less a selective approach when targeting at pre-defined and -selected groups. Consequently, in the participative literature it is discussed if state institutions use this kind of top-down legitimized civic participation, only ostensibly representing the interests of the society and especially its marginalized groups (Silver et al. 2010, p. 455, cf. ch. 2.3). In the view of these authors, top-down initiated civic participation and collective engagement does not necessarily support equality among society but much more the opposite. It potentially enables more powerful lobby and interest groups as legitimized stakeholders in state-promoted participative actions, who potentially dispose about access to public institutions others do not have, to steer the outcomes in a preferred direction (Silver

et al. 2010, see e.g., Morison 2000; Dean 1999). In urban settings this might be for example the case for advocacy groups of the construction or real estate industry. The debate about top-down and bottom-up collective actions also refers to one of the main questions within the research discourse about collective and participatory actions: are they about conflict or consensus.

2.3.3 *Conflict versus consensus*

There are heated debates among scholars if collective and participatory actions should seek for 'consensus' or 'conflict' and hence are about 'deliberation' or 'contestation' (Silver et al. 2010). This distinction is often used synonymously as one between top-down and bottom-up induced approaches, the latter being typically associated with progressive civic grassroots but also reactive NIMBY movements. But they can arise too, where elites try to lobby and shape the society, economy and politics in their own interest or are in need for public acceptance and compliance (Silver et al. 2010, p. 454).

By its critics the path of consensus is often misused by state authorities and influential clientele groups to "[...] offload public responsibilities, defuse protest, co-opt opponents, [or] impose social control [...]", leading to an increased depoliticized society (Silver et al. 2010, p. 455, cf. van Gunsteren 2006). The consensus approach is not exclusive to collective and participative actions induced in a top-down manner by state institutions. Rather also bottom-up grassroots movements, originally following the path of contestation and standing in conflict with public authorities and other institutionalized organizations, can be incorporated in state governance and amend their strategy towards consensus through deliberation. But undoubtedly incorporation into governance patterns alters the structure of grassroots civic engagement, demanding the formalization of financial and professional capacities. Critics claim that such formalizations should silence oppositional voices and divide initiators of civic engagement and the people committed to it (Silver et al. 2010, p. 454, 460–462). In any way, it is argued that if they want to succeed, local participative and collective initiatives based on consensus between society, the state and additional legitimized, probably economic, actors should seek for practical objectives as part of a clearly outlined problem statement. These might pertain to the use of land, housing and other urban space as well as public services, education, or environment (Silver et al. 2010, p. 462–463, cf. Fung and Wright 2001).

For those who criticize the consensus-oriented form of participatory actions, bottom-up mobilization provides residents with the opportunity to demand their rights to their urban environment by emphasizing views and needs (Silver et al. 2010, p. 454). The hardly avoidable circumstance that different actors involved in urban governance structures

dispose about the resources needed to varying degrees gives proponents of contestation through collective action another quite striking argument. The unequal distribution of resources, power and network relations inhibits a level playing field upfront and leads inevitably to a skewed form of consensus (Silver et al. 2010, p. 454, cf. Fraser 1992).

Some authors (see e.g., Silver et al. 2010) plead for a middle road where conflict and consensus are seen as different stages within the same process. Thus, they challenge the strict either-or dichotomy between consensus and conflict or top-down and bottom-up. In their view, both types of participation do not necessarily represent incompatible positions. In fact, if sharing the same field of interest, they can timely and spatially intersect. And where pragmatism benefits both of them, timely and spatially intersecting conflict- respectively consensus-oriented collective actions can be probably harmonized somewhat through mutually learning from each other (Silver et al. 2010, p. 454).

Ultimately, conflict can culminate in consensus where collective civic engagement in the form of protest changes its character and leads to a compromise-based decision making. This requires that local residents or their representatives engage, even if it is only timely limited, with former antagonists and agree with them on strategies and objectives to find solutions. In this scenario, after consensus has been reached, the citizens who initially draw attention to their demands through collective actions of protest and contestation ideally are still participating in target achievement. Thereby, gradual transformation into more institutionalized forms of participation embedded in urban governance patterns can contribute to the success of conflict-oriented collective citizen movements. In the event, residents are excluded from the strategy implementation after being integrated into urban governance structures, as prophesized by the opponents of consensus-based citizen participation, they can potentially react in two ways: They either can adopt a controlling function, observing process outcomes and demanding accountability from those who are in charge to implement the agreed strategy based on their initial demands. This might be especially an alternative acceptable for those with extensive knowledge about the situation at place and the subject of initial conflict. Or alternatively, they revive their actions of resistance and protest (Silver 2010 et al., p. 454, 465, cf. Stoker 2004).

The supporters of this middle path during which contestation is transformed into deliberation claim that it tackles an often-expressed reservation about collective citizen actions in general and grassroot movements in particular: that they are unable to produce tangible results. Moreover, it allows citizens to collectively participate in urban governance structures and subsequently oversee policy performance and transparency. This could have a positive effect on the perception of the state as a partner rather than, at best, a neutral observer setting the rules of the game. Or even worse, as an opponent who is not willingly to serve its primary function: the welfare of its citizens (Silver et al. 2010, p. 454, 459; Sabel

et al. 1999, p. 14). An assumption particularly interesting for the present research, as in Ukrainian urban landscapes the trust in public planning authorities and the real estate and construction sector is traditionally, and out of experience, is very low.

Consequently, the supporters of a middle path contest the notion of participative and collective movements as being strictly antagonistic and looking either for conflict or consensus in a twofold manner. According to them, at different phases of political process, one or the other type can be more suitable and successful than the other. Some authors refer to this as the 'cycle of contestation and consensus' or 'social movement cycles' (see e.g., Tarrow 1994). Secondly, movements of conflict and consensus can harmonize to a degree where they spatially and timely intersect. Both means that in the same setting with the same actors the collective actions can change their character over time. And thus, another assumption is denied as well: that confrontation between actors of different status and with unequal resources can be never resolved amicably without coercion (Silver et al. 2010, p. 454).

3. Fighting for Kyiv, Ukraine: a city's unleashed real estate sector versus its citizens

In order to empirically apply the above outlined analytical framework to analyse constraints and opportunities of collective actions to protect the architectural heritage from commercial-oriented real estate development, in the following chapter the case-specific background will be outlined. The first part will provide a more general overview of the current situation and developments in Kyiv's and Ukraine's real estate sector and its bearing on architectural heritage. In a second part, the genesis of the *Save Kvity Ukrainy* collective movement, to be analysed for its constraints, opportunities, and implications for its surrounding urban environment, will be traced.

3.1 What is going wrong in Kyiv's real estate, planning and construction sector

A look at Kyiv's urban landscape leaves one probably astonished with the sheer number of construction sites. The boom in Kyiv's real estate sector and its consequences literally rises in front of your nose. This happens partly on reasonable grounds. Currently, there is a huge shortcoming and corresponding urgent need of housing (see e.g., Mamo 2021; Fedoriv and Lomonosova 2019; Liasheva 2018).

But there is also another side of the coin whereas the sector acts in an unleashed manner reminding one about the moment of the robber barons during the Gilded Age of the industrial revolution. By following globally known market mechanisms, the booming sector acts to a large degree in a way ignoring the needs of the population, meaning it does not contribute to mitigating Kyiv's housing problem. Instead of the much-needed affordable housing for the middle-class and urban poor, multi-storey complexes are built, hosting luxury apartments, shopping malls, spa salons, and offices under one roof (Tymoshchuk and Kulchynskyi 2019; Liasheva 2018).

Enabled by a conglomerate of corruption and insufficiently working authorities, rules and regulations, theoretically in place to steer the sector, are circumvented by developers (Tymoshchuk and Kulchynskyi 2019). Decision-making processes about the classification, allocation, and intended purpose of the urban space take place in secret, mostly separated from the public. The decision-outcomes agreed on are accordingly mostly in favour of closed circles with little interest in the common good but all the more in their business

(Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 58–59, cf. ch. 3.3, 5.1.1, 5.1.3). With their projects, these actors occupy every urban space they can get hold of, regardless of whether or how it has been used up to now (Tymoshchuk and Kulchynskiy 2019).

Kyiv's centre is disproportionately affected by these developments, albeit the city's administrative borders still encompass large areas of unoccupied land at its outskirts. But developing this unused land outside the centre would require larger initial investments due to the required infrastructure for communication, water and energy supply as well as streets and public transport, not in place yet. Besides, in their strictly commercial-oriented business practices, for developers it is much more cost-effective to maximise the quantity of storeys as the cost square per meter decreases with their number (Tymoshchuk and Kulchynskiy 2019). This puts many of the historical buildings in danger. Rarely built from a strictly commercial point of view and offering little space for structural expansion measures on the existing property, they are becoming a popular object of speculation.

The renewed 'General Plan of Kyiv City' (hereinafter Kyiv General Plan – KGP), recently adopted in March 2020 and Kyiv's only official instrument of urban planning, has been proven of low practical value to counteract these developments. Especially, experts criticize that the renewed KGP it is obsolete from the scratch, ignoring the validity and importance of public space, it follows an unsustainable approach, continuing to ignore the citizen's needs (Ponomorova et al. 2020). It is only the last episode in the inglorious history of failed urban planning in Kyiv. Failing to utilize the newly gained independence for a restart after decades of Soviet centralized urban development in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, Kyiv has little experience with integrative citizen-oriented city planning. It was more that Soviet centralized urban planning was replaced by a real estate sector, partly privatized in a chaotic gold-rush atmosphere. The result are opaque structures of city authorities together with public and private companies controlling Kyiv's development. This created an until today lasting environment promoting short-sighted profit-seeking in the sector, rather than expertise or even a critical discourse among all stakeholders. Consequences of this misguided process are visible all over the city: cars blocking boardwalks in anyway bad conditions, a smog-laden air, or an insufficient public transport infrastructure (Ponomorova et al. 2020).

Besides the structural shortcomings of Kyiv's real estate, construction and developing sector rooting in its specific history of post-communist transition, there are also economic factors determined by a globalized liberal market economy. According to insiders, it seems like the overwhelming demand on the real estate sales market originates from investors rather than purchasers with the intention of own use. Anyhow, for many Ukrainians it is still costly to purchase properties. For instance, the pay-off rate for a 70-square meter apartment in Kyiv for the average citizens amounts to more than 20 years. In parallel, as

mortgages for real estate in Kyiv come usually with high interest rates, the investment in new housing projects is only for monetary privileged people an option. By implication, this means that ownership of real estate properties in Kyiv accumulates in the hands of a comparatively small group, with institutional investors dominating over private ones. And for those who can afford it, investments in Kyiv's real estate sector is all the more profitable. For the last 15 years, with in average 27,8%, the annual growing rates accumulate to + 430% amounting to UAH 36,800 per square metre in 2021 (Attia 2021; Mamo 2021). Foreign blogger like The Wandering Investor (2021) therefore advice their followers to "buy very large units in the core centre of Kyiv to take advantage of the lack of financing to get great per m² prices" and "[...] rent them out as office space [...] as core Kyiv offers very high yields and is short in supply [...]."

3.2 A challenging intention: protecting modernism architectural heritage in Ukraine

In Kyiv, unlike the more than 3,000 architectural objects of classical architecture assigned with the status of a historical monument, only six buildings erected during the era of post-war Soviet modernism are protected by law. The inclusion of some of these objects in the register of national or local historical monuments would not only help to raise awareness about their value among a broader public. It would also provide significant advantages for further conservation and limit utilization through commercially oriented investors (*Rynok vyryshyt?* 2021; International Council on Monuments and Sites – ICOMOS 2016, p. 135).

Anyhow, this could not guarantee the full protection of modernist buildings. When a legally recognized object is attributed with a monument protection status, the status alone does not protect these structures from a renovation or gradual destruction violating the law. Other, there are additional, more classical barriers opposing the preservation of architectural heritage in Ukraine and further complicate their protection. During the last 20 years or so, the mentioned absence of a strong monitoring in interaction with growing private activities in a corrupt building sector (cf. ch. 3.1) has led to a situation, where private property owners or renters occupying several rooms or floors, often altering them in such a drastic way that the original substance is no longer visible. This is made possible by shortcomings in the legislation according to which the term 'preparatory work' in a real estate project proposal can theoretically contain any kind of construction measure, even demolition. So, actually if besides the foundation only a little or nothing is left, it is eligible to declare any construction measure a reconstruction. This poses a constant danger for major

losses in the authentic heritage, which authorities mostly let go of with impunity. (Khenhistov 2021a; *Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021; Vyshnytska 2021; ICOMOS 2016: 135).

The defence of modernist architecture in Ukraine is also complicated by the fact that these objects are associated with the history, culture, and politics of the USSR. Built between 1945 and 1989, for many Ukrainians they collectively and automatically represent the Soviet regime with its totalitarian features. Attempts by activists to protect objects of modernist architecture from destruction are faced with criticism from conservative groups, who reproach them with alleged attachment to the Soviet regime. They also criticize activists, claiming that Soviet architecture was built by Russian architects, and therefore does not deserve preservation, because it does not reflect Ukrainian history. All of this placed a stigma on the modernist buildings of the Soviet era. It is more difficult for activists to frame them as objects of historical heritage in conditions when part of the public seeks to get rid of the Soviet heritage, allowing the material manifestations of this period to gradually decline or collapse. Although activists try to resist such reproaches and distinguish between the crimes of the Soviet Union and modernist architecture, the historicity frame still remains ineffective for saving such objects. Especially when considering that in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests the issue of Ukrainian history as part of the USSR has been questioned with a renewed emphasis. Ukrainian politics also took on this discourse with the adoption of the Law “On the Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Regimes, and Prohibition of Propaganda of their Symbols” in April 2015. The Law lacks any scientific-based guidelines for the demolition or preservation of monuments as well as for the definition of the artistic, architectural, historical or urban values of objects. Neither is any public participation foreseen in such decision processes about the status of the respective monuments (*Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021; Stoffers 2020, pp. 9–11; ICOMOS 2016, pp. 133, 135).

Discourse stakeholders from the civil society and experts claim the need to make Soviet modernism in Ukraine a part of modern culture that is accepted on a mental level. Thereby in the public mind, it can be rationalized why an object is worth preserving. They argue that by now, unfortunately, most unique objects of modernism are perceived by many as a scoop. To further rationalize and intensify the discourse, a new type of status for such objects should be developed. It may not be a monument of architecture, but a monument of modernism, for which the framework of adaptation and reconstruction will be provided. For each object, a passport should be developed. This passport should contain information about the material and immaterial value that the object has and what restrictions and necessities exist in order to restore it to a benefit for all. This would counteract the fact that much of the modernist architected heritage, unprofitability without additional investment and unattractiveness for commercial activities, can ultimately become a problem for urban

settings. Usually, objects built in a modernist style are distinguished by their scale, functionality of forms, and originality of compositional solutions. But viewed from a modern point of view they are also low energy efficient. It happens that a modernist building becomes more expensive to maintain than it can give us now in its authentic form and the land under the building is already worth more than itself. Today, many of these buildings are not used for their intended purpose, some of them are also owned by the state, and do not have enough funds for proper maintenance. But the introduction of such a passport would be possible only after an in-depth analysis of the objects and public discussions. Therefore, a form of public demand for the study, preservation, and reconstruction of unique objects of Soviet modernism needs to be created. This could not be achieved without the desire of a critical mass of the population and public organizations that are engaged in the preservation of modernist objects sitting at the same table with the Ministry of Culture (Manucharian 2021).

Other specific suggestions in support for a rationalization of the discourse about the historical and cultural heritage of Soviet modernist architecture aim at its integration into the new realities. The chief architect of the city of Lviv, Yulian Chaplinskyi, proposes the categorization of Soviet modernism into two types: common buildings, which do not carry value, and individual projects. And at this distinction he sees the room for a broad discussion which is needed, and as an outcome should ideally define how to integrate those buildings of architectural and immaterial value in their present environment. If necessary, through constructional and technical adjustments in line with good standards of architectural heritage protection which do not falsify their original roots. Indeed, examples like the Lybid Hotel are ones of successful renovations in accordance with monument protection regulations in Kyiv, where buildings were not demolished, but used for commercial purposes (Khenhistov 2021a; Manucharian 2021).

3.3 Saving Soviet modernist architecture through collective action: the case of Kvity Ukrainy

In Kyiv, the conflict between the preservation of architectural heritage and commercial real estate development recently often sparked by the destruction of Soviet modernist buildings (see e.g., Manucharian 2021; *Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021).

One current example was the planned deconstruction of the modernist *Kvity Ukrainy* (engl. "Flowers of Ukraine") pavilion at Sichovykh Striltsiv Street, a main traffic axis in Kyiv's city centre (see Fig. 2). Built in 1985 as headquarter for a communal enterprise of the same name and being awarded the Union of Architects Award for the same year, the pavilion

comprised an atrium with a flower and plant shop on the ground floor and an exhibition hall on the second floor (see Fig. 3). The other premises hold space for an educational section for workshops and floristry courses and workshops and a greenhouse with research laboratories (see Fig. 3). Subsequently, between 2010 and 2020, the building hosted a supermarket and then stood empty since it left. And a few years ago, the property owners began to alter its facade. In particular, they covered the glass cascade with a tin roof spoiling the facade and the natural lighting of the atrium (Khenhistov 2021a; Vyshnytska 2021).



Fig. 2 – The Kvity Ukrainy pavilion seen from outside and inside in the 1980s

(Sources: Save Kvity Ukrainy 2021a, b)

In June 2021, the local residents became more or less accidentally aware of this new real estate development project in their neighbourhood. From one day to another, an opaque fence was built around the pavilion. On the information table at the construction site, the project was indicated as renovation and overhaul measures. An Oleksii Pyshnyi, titling himself "managing partner" of the investor, a joint-stock company which adopted the name 'Kvity Ukrainy', stated the investment was worth USD 12 million. His partner and co-owner of the building, who apparently had left Ukraine in 2014 to the Czech Republic only to return in 2019, initially remained unknown but later turned out to be an Andrii Skalozub⁶ (Khenhistov 2021a; Manucharian 2021; Vyshnytska 2021).

At the same time, no one saw either the project plan itself or permits for it. And when the workers began to remove the grapes, which have been swaddling one of the house facades for thirty years (see Fig. 3), and subsequently started to remove windows, from

⁶ Author's note: In 2016, both Oleksii Pyshnyi and Andrii Skalozub, appeared with their offshore accounts in the infamous Panama Papers leak (see e.g., International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 2015; Zvihlyanych 2016).

their statements gradually it became obvious that this development project was about a completely new office complex, tantamount to tearing down the Kvity Ukrainy building, rather than any alleged renovation work (Khenhistov 2021a; Manucharian 2021; Vyshnytska 2021).




Fig. 3 – The Kvity Ukrainy pavilion as of summer 2021 just before deconstruction began (left) and occupied, just after partial deconstruction (right)

(Sources: Anna Palekha 2021; Ukrainska Pravda 2021)

This was clearly an illegal undertaking as local resident Taras Hrytsiuk, a historian and already NGO-founder, claimed immediately. Not only because the Kyiv City State Administration's (KCSA) Department of Cultural Heritage (DCH) did not approve the pre-project proposals and therefore the permission for any construction work altering the Kvity Ukrainy building was missing. But also, because one of its architects, Mykola Levchuk, is still alive, and although being contacted by the investor in advance, did not grant any permission for the deconstruction work. But exactly this is mandatory as in Ukraine personal immaterial property rights and prerogatives of the aesthetic design are valid throughout the life of the architects, designers, and landscape planners. This means an architect may require the integrity of his work to be preserved and oppose any substantial alterations. Still, the immaterial property right can only be upheld if the original building remains for which the foundation is theoretically sufficient (cf. ch. 3.2). Out of experience and not expecting anything good, quickly a group of neighbourhood citizens around Taras Hrytsiuk organized themselves to take steps of action to prevent the building from being demolished. The neighbourhood initiative, assisted from the beginning with legal support and advice by the NGO *Mapa Renovatsii* (engl. "Renovation Map"), soon launched a public awareness campaign. As part of their campaign, they appealed to the media, deputies of the Kyiv City Council (KCC), and Parliament and wrote a collective complaint to the Kyiv of Construction

Control (KDCC). Finally, they found support from the Member of Ukrainian Parliament (MoP) Dmytro Hurin who supported the goals of their collective actions and were invited to a meeting of the KDCC-commission (Ekonomichna Pravda 2021; Khenhistov 2021a, 2021b; Stasiuk 2021a, 2021b; Vyshnytska 2021).



Fig. 4 – Reconstruction of the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion according to plans of the current owner (left) respectively according to an alternative pro-bono concept by Kyivan architects (right)

(Sources: Dukhovychnyi 2021; Kalambet and Doikov 2021)

The activists succeed to meet with the architect, listed on the construction site info box as the responsible person overseeing the project. According to the architect, so far, he had prepared only pre-project proposals for the reconstruction customer but nothing concrete. At the meeting, it appeared that the pavilion should now give way in favour of a real estate development project for a nine-story, 27 meters-high, office and business centre with underground parking. In addition, the proposed project would largely reduce the public space in front of the building, only leaving a narrow sidewalk. Interestingly enough, additionally leaked reports indicated an adjustment made in the planning documents after the preparations for construction work had begun and the project goal was changed from “new construction” into “reconstruction” (Khenhistov 2021a, 2021b; Vyshnytska 2021).

Even more, MoP Hurin claimed that he found a forgery in the developer's documentation, sending a request to the Department of Land Resources of the KCSA. He received a copy of the 1998 lease agreement according to which the owner has to operate and maintain the building for 49 years. This means that for now the building can only be overhauled, but not reconstructed. A change of purpose for the site is possible only by the decision of the KCC on the basis of the approved official development plan as stated by the

“Town planning provisions for the construction and maintenance of trade buildings”, issued in 2020 (Khenhistov 2021a, 2021b; Vyshnytska 2021).

The activists and the MoP also tried for three weeks without success, to meet the building's owner personally. Still, in response to their actions and a suggestion made by the MoP, Oleksii Pyshnyi announced to hold an open architectural competition for the renovation of the building in accordance with Ukrainian monument protection laws and with the permission of Levchuk. But the promised competition was never held. Instead, the investor announced a, never happened, press conference to present his reconstruction plans and a new fence was built and the builder began to dismantle the pavilion facade and on 12 July its atrium. The *Save Kvity Ukrainy* activists stated the day before they had received a message from Pyshnyi where he offered to meet with four of them to find a compromise. Still, with the limitation that the meeting would be only four days after the actual demolition of the building, as well as “without stopping work, mediators and public discussions.” After the metropolitan police ignored several of their calls, this led the activists to take concrete steps of physical activity. Around 200 activists gathered to tear down the fence, block the equipment and occupy the building. In the course of events, several arrests were imposed among the activists (Ekonomichna Pravda 2021; Khenhistov 2021a, 2021b; Stasiuk 2021a, 2021b; Vyshnytska 2021).

The investor protested that the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion had already lost its original appearance from the 1980s and was nearly empty when we became the owner of the building. Pyshnyi claimed the cash flow from the entire rent was about USD 6,000 a month, whereas the running cost of the building was much higher. In addition, it was in bad structural condition and as a commercial place simply not feasible with even the supermarket not operating by official standards. He also emphasized that the building did not have any status of architectural protection and that is why the owner had a full legal right to renovate it. Pyshnyi called the intention to give the building the status of a cultural heritage object “legal nihilism” and the protesters against its demolition “pseudo-activists”. He accused MoP Hurin of having organized their actions as he had allegedly “a personal interest in stopping investors” (Khenhistov 2021b).

Despite these unproven allegations, Pyshnyi assured that this project was something for the citizens of Kyiv and predicted a monthly income of around USD 150 thousand. That the office and business complex would be a place for the whole community where Kyivans can find things they allegedly do not have in their neighbourhood by now: a food market and a sports club. From the third to the eighth floor there should also be co-working spaces available for rent. Pyshnyi reassured his will to hold the tender for the renovation project, but it will be closed and will take place according to pre-established rules because the developer cannot afford to “spend time on endless discussions.” He further

assured that "architects who understand the history of Kyiv" would be invited – including the architect of the original project, Mykola Levchuk, who initially refused to participate in the project, allegedly "due to ill health." In an interview with KyivVlast, the developer also spoke about the intention to create a "media facade here, which would give the building uniqueness and on which you could see green vegetation, autumn golden leaves or cheerful Santa Claus." (Khenhistov 2021b).

In parallel with these events, architect Levchuk filed a lawsuit against the investor. On 15 July 2021 Kyiv's Shevchenkivskyi District Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. It seized the building and prohibited any continuation of the construction work on the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion until it had come to a decision on the trial for infringement of the architect's non-property copyrights. Following the decision, the DCH also added the pavilion to its list of cultural heritage objects declared the Kvity Ukrainy building subject to protection under Article 37 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of Cultural Heritage" (cf. ch. 3.2). In turn, this step also demands the addition of the building to the State Register of "Immovable Monuments of Ukraine" by the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture. For the property owner, the DCH measure means that he must conclude a protection agreement for the newly identified object within a month. In particular, any work on the now protected objects can be carried out only with the written permission of the relevant cultural heritage protection authority and based on an agreed scientific and project documentation (Ekonomichna Pravda 2021; Stasiuk 2021b).

For the activists gathering around *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, the argument for preserving this object in its authentic form was quite simple: despite being privately owned, in its use as a flower selling, exhibition and research centre followed by a supermarket, it was always perceived as public space open to everyone. As a result, local residents associate this place with a lot of memories and emotions. In their view, the building, although not disposing about the status of an architectural monument until recently, is a unique structure for the city. The uniqueness of the building, according to both experts and the broader public, is in the organic nature of the external environment: the cascading facade allows you to integrate the modernist building into the historical landscape without disturbing the height and without focusing excessive attention on itself (Khenhistov 2021a, 2021b).

Therefore, besides the intended alterations to the building structure, the conflict here does not seem so much ignite with the question on formal but more with informal ownership, meaning accessibility. For the *Save Kvity Ukrainy* activists and those who committed to their goals, it was unacceptable that the investor wanted to turn the building into a "closed" office building complex, taking it away from common use. At the same time, many of the protesters agreed that the building should be commercially used and attractive as it has been already the case. They stressed that solutions could be found that will preserve its architecture and

public accessibility and at the same time make the building profitable for investors (Khenhistov 2021a, 2021b).

Applying the above outlined urban governance framework for multiple transformations of the post-communist urban settings, the *Save Kvity Ukrainy* movement can be described as a social movement in conflict with actors from the private sector, and probably, a question to be answered within this research, institutional actors of the administrative authorities (cf. Pierre 2014; Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012). In this way, surely the movement with its attempt to prevent the demolition of the pavilion at Sichovykh Striltsiv Street was not the first of its kind, neither in Kyiv nor in Ukraine. But for the first time in the history of Ukrainian urban planning, it was achieved that a court made use of his right to ban planned or ongoing construction works as a precautionary security measure in a law case on infringement of non-property copyrights of an architect (Stasiuk 2021a⁷). Beyond that first concrete result, the *Save Kvity Ukrainy* activists again not only actualized the problem of architectural heritage destruction in Ukraine. Much more, they gave rise to discussions about the importance of protecting precisely the modernist architecture in the country (see e.g., Manucharian 2021; *Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021).

3.3.1 *The Kvity Ukrainy pavilion: one of many potential objects of collective actions?*

By the time, the conflict around the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion flared up, the district court responsible for this matter also ordered the seizure of another building in a criminal case where the construction project disregarded the architectural copyright claim (Stasiuk 2021a). It is apparent that the *Kvity Ukrainy* case is only one among many. Indeed, Kyiv-based architect Daria Korba stated that many citizens are tired of the destruction of architecture throughout the city. According to her, by summer 2021, in Kyiv about 20 historical buildings, both pre-revolutionary and modernist, are prepared for demolition. He, as an expert familiar with the situation of urban planning in Kyiv claims that they have never witnessed such a threat to the city's architectural heritage in any other year before. Or as another activist puts it into words: There are too many buildings to protect them around the clock. And when a bulldozer is driving right at you, it is quite difficult to withhold a stand (Khenhistov 2021b; Matveichuk 2021).

Hence, although in the case of the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion the activists were successful for the first to defend this architectural heritage from destruction, observers of the situation raised questions. In particular, they question the effectiveness and justification

⁷ Author's note: This was coherently stated during case study interview 1 by an active member of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*.

of these attempts to defend modernist architecture in the form of collective civic engagement and if it is not worth reflecting on alternative strategies (*Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021). For instance, a few years ago, for the attempted salvation of the Tarilka building at Kyiv's Antonovycha Street (see Fig. 4). The building was built during the second wave of Soviet modernism in 1971 as home to the Ukrainian Institute of Scientific and Technical Expertise and Information residing in its premises until today.



Fig. 5 – The Tarilka building at Kyiv's Antonovycha Street in the 1970s

(*Savekyivmodernism 2021a*)

During the time, the shape of the building has not only become an aesthetic feature but was originally presented as a solution to the problem of the insufficient extent of the building site designated for its construction. To counteract the problem of space, the architect Florian Yuriev, lifted its auditory from the ground into the air, creating space for the adjacent street (*Rynok vyrishyt?*; *Savekyivmodernism 2021*).

However, nowadays the institute's premises including the library do not occupy the entire area of the building; some floors have been idle for decades. And when it became public that the building has been bought by an investor, activists started the project *Savekyivmodernism*. The activists noted the special acoustics in the auditorium, which

allows you to hear the entire frequency range of voices and musical instruments, and developed a pro bono proposal for the renovation in accordance with monument protection regulations (see Fig. 5). Nevertheless, nobody including the investor has picked up their ideas and so the situation around the Tarilka building remains unclear (*Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021; *Savekyivmodernism* 2021).



Fig. 6 – Re-purposed Tarilka building as seen from outside according to Savekyivmodernism’s pro-bono concept

(Savekyivmodernism 2021b)

Framing the public debate with the term ‘uniqueness’ seems to be more and more the main argument for activists in Kyiv who defend modernist architecture. And as just shown by the example of *Kvity Ukrainy* the uniqueness frame contains an indeed powerful emotional component. When a modernist building is a threat of destruction, in Ukraine the outrage from individuals or city authorities is great. The more unique an object of modernist architecture is, the stronger the anger at those responsible for the preservation and being perceived as failing, especially if the structure cannot be saved. In the view of the public, the tragedy of the destruction of modernist architecture may even exceed the tragedy of the destruction of other classical historical monuments (*Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021).

This perception is supported by examples where even if a modernist object is not under threat of destruction, activists are still looking for its unique features in order to justify its value and reduce the likelihood of destruction. This makes the uniqueness argument seemingly be convenient for activists. Especially, in the widespread absence of conservation status for modernist properties, arguments about uniqueness and exclusivity show and enhance the importance of preservation to the broader public (*Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021).

However, besides there are more visible obstacles and systemic processes preventing local people from living in the desired space and exercising their right to the city. Above all, Kyiv’s society knows little about the nexus between the grey reality of its urban

environment and the non-transparent networks between politics and business. This goes hand in hand with being hardly aware of opportunities and rights of participations in issues of urban development leading to exclusion (Ponomorova et al. 2020). And nevertheless Ponomorova et al. (2020) recognize a trend of increasing confrontations between developers and activists, leading them to assumption of Kyiv being on the way to an 'insurgent polis' (cf. Swyngedouw 2007). In their opinion activists encounter the same mistake the inactive part of society, not framing their actions within their reality of a corrupt and opaque urban realm (Ponomorova et al. 2020).

Other observers familiar with the situation stress that the alleged limitation of this frame turns out to be in its point-like nature. They argue that localized protests such as those around the Kivity Ukrainy pavilion can save individual structures and can work well when it comes to protecting a single property, but it has only limited to no effect when it comes to integrated conservation of the environment or the full protection of modernist structures. The feeling of freedom and one's own influence will only be temporary and at some point, the potential of local protests is exhausted. This makes attempts to preserve architectural objects again becoming pinpoint. The constant search for uniqueness can lead activists to a dead end when, in the end, it cannot be found or justified. In addition, this frame does not help to find common ground with other anti-forgetful initiatives, such as environmental-oriented ones, and does not contribute to the development of a mass urban movement, which would aim to preserve modernist architecture as a permanent category. It encourages mobilization only during the active destruction of individual objects and is unable to interest the public in the preservation of other valuable modernist attractions. Neither does it change the situation in general, where the poor condition of the 20th century architectural and urban infrastructure in interaction with an insufficient legal framework is exploited by commercially oriented developers with their partial illegal undertakings. Not surprisingly, real estate investors and developers are known to be often on the lookout specifically for an object without protection status. And when it comes to which are often of modernist origin there are many of them (*Rynok vyrishyt?* 2021; Shnaider 2020; ICOMOS 2016, p. 135).

3.3.2 *Change beyond case-based ad-hoc measures?*

It might be, that activists in Kyiv have become aware that isolated collective actions arising around single case studies are too narrow and too less sustainable approach. For 2 October 2021, 46 NGOs and public grass-roots initiatives, among them *Save Kivity Ukrainy*, called for the *Marsh za Kyiv* (engl. "March for Kyiv"), beginning on the Constitution Square (see Fig. 7). The confederation claimed that the urban setting with its space and environment is

a public domain, and therefore the opinion of the society must always be taken into account. And although these goals were already supported through the existence of many dispersed small initiatives worth supporting, these individual actions were now in need of a broader basis in society and more coherent coordination. That is why this big collective event was needed to regain the right to the city (Matveichuk 2021). Ivan Verbytskyi, a representative of the NGO “Centre for Society Research” stated:

“The idea of rallying for protest has been hanging in the air for a long time. There are many problems in Kyiv that small and large organizations are struggling to address. By uniting, we can loudly declare that the city has been moving in the wrong direction for a long time. There is a systemic problem. And we want to state this. Of course, having 46 organizers is a big challenge. But each of these initiatives sees great value in joint action, and this gives us strength.”

(Matveichuk 2021)

Also, for the first time, Kyiv's citizens jointly expressed their dissatisfaction with the city's policies, actions, and authorities' inaction accumulated over the years in a collective action where all political symbols were banned (Matveichuk 2021).




Fig. 7 – Activists of Kivity Ukrainy, attending the Marsh za Kyiv, holding a transparent saying “Do not destroy – Restore!”

(Source: Save Kivity Ukrainy 2021c)

Among the demands of the participants were the stop of illegal real estate development in the city, a comprehensive reform of the public transport system as well as the creation of conditions guaranteeing clean water and air. They categorized their collective actions in eleven working groups, each dedicated to one of their main objectives, such as mobility, transport, ecology, cultural heritage protection, and construction (Matveichuk 2021).

A representative from *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, expressed the hopes that new iterations in revealing the value of modernist architecture will finally allow us to deal with the causes, and not the consequences of the destruction of the urban environment. She said that in this context a point of no return has been reached. Activists have been constantly telling us not to panic, feed promises, or create fewer effective tools for communicating with the authorities, which minimally reduce outrage. A hotline for citizens' complaints has been installed. But Kyiv has lost many historic buildings this year and the trust among the civil society in its authorities has been disappointed again and again (Matveichuk 2021).

4. 'Theory in practice': a methodological framework to analyse collective actions⁸

The decision of how to execute the research work was taken in favour of an empirical social research design. Applying a theory generating methodology, it enables the researcher to avail himself of case studies to develop theories by resorting on already present knowledge (see e.g., Döringer 2020; Bogner and Menz 2018, 2009). In this thesis, analysing the case study of *Save Kvity Ukraine* aims on expanding the theory urban governance in post-communist urban settings on the aspect of participation through collective action. More precisely, this study aims to assess if collective actions such as *Save Kvity Ukraine* can potentially serve as institutional actors in post-communistic urban settings to strive for the protection of architectural heritage in Ukraine if they succeed to generate participations. Here, expert interviews with actors involved in the events around the *Kvity Ukraine* deconstruction seemed to be most suitable as the major method of empirical research in order to answer the research question underlying this case study (cf. Pierre 2014; Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012).

Supplementary, by means of what Patton (1999) refer to as 'method triangulation' the researcher is in a position to consult and utilize several complementary sources of information. Thus, the empirical analysis is supported by academic and grey literature as well as publicly available information on the politico- and socio-economic situation with regard to architectural heritage and urban transformation in Kyiv and Ukraine (cf. ch. 3). Such information might be gathered from governmental statements, other official documents or other sources like posts in social media. By this methodological weaknesses and disinformation can be eliminated reciprocally. Alternatively, in case a final clarification is not possible, contradictions that require further in-depth research can be highlighted. Consequently, the interpretation of relevant information given by interview partners under assurance of anonymity will be enhanced (Patton 1999, pp. 1192–1193).

On this account a comprehensive prior desk research was undertaken. Themed literature published in scientific journals or by the state, renowned organisations, media and companies acting in the sphere of development cooperation, economic and policy was consulted. In this nexus, the consulted type of information was mainly grey literature such as official documents in form of statements, publications, press releases, reports and studies or data accessible on websites. The consultation of grey literature was especially

⁸ Cf. e.g., Argyris and Schön 1992

important as the present study deals with a highly dynamic, actually during the time of research still developing, issue in which changes in the status quo can occur from one day to another.

For this case study, much of the grey literature was provided in the form of specialized information channels, especially online media such as *Khmarochos* and *Mistosite*, covering issues of urban planning and architectural heritage in Ukraine. Upfront of the research conducted for this thesis, it could be assumed that the line between the operators of these information channels and the activists aiming on protecting architectural heritage in Ukraine are potentially blurry. Therefore, one and the same actor can theoretically participate in both, the provision of the most relevant background information in the form of grey literature as well as the collective action analysed in this thesis. Related to this, if intentionally or not, it might be possible that the actors are not fully objective and use their information to shape public opinion according to their agenda. Both questions needed to be considered and best possible answered through the research for this case study (cf. Patton 1999, pp. 1192–1193).

Notwithstanding, operators of and participants in these aforementioned information channels are in possession of first-hand, and often exclusive, information pertaining the case example dealt within the present thesis. This is why, following Patton's (1999) methodological triangulation, I fall back on them as another main source of information besides empirical research in form of expert interviews.

4.1 The research design in its practical application

Besides an extensive literature research, the realisation of the planned research demanded a methodology for empirical investigation suitable to gain the necessary background information underlying the theoretical framework and research question. The decision to fall back on expert interviews as a qualitative methodology of empirical social research went hand-in-hand with the aim of the thesis. A qualitative approach allows to understand causal mechanisms by revealing the link between cause and effect. By definition in qualitative social research, a chain of causation begins with a number of events, possibly affiliated with each other, and leading to a specific result under specific circumstances (Gläser and Laudel 2019, pp. 3–6). This allows further research on understanding what are the constraints and potentials of collective urban actions culminating with the aim of protecting architectural heritage. Especially in terms of how the post-communist urban transformation or events in Ukraine's history such as the Euromaidan are interwoven with the emergence of these collective actions.

Another argument is that expert interviews offer the opportunity to reconstruct internal processes of collective actions and their impacts on their surrounding urban setting (cf. Döringer 2020, pp. 270–271; Gläser and Laudel 2019, p. 5). Concerning this, the main intention of expert interviews conducted for this thesis was on the generation of otherwise non-available factual information by semi-structured guided interviews featuring open questions. This leaves room for the interviewed stakeholders to express their personal impressions, perceptions and opinions (Döringer 2020, p. 266).

Knowledge production through the conduct of expert interviews presupposes an appropriate tool to analyse the generated crude data in form of transcripts. Out of two reasons the 'extractive qualitative content analysis'⁹ lends itself very well (Gläser and Laudel 2019). In the first place, it is the only analytical method which enables a systematic filtration of the crude data right after being collected to process it with regard to the research question. Still, the second reason is much more outbalanced. As with every qualitative analysis, ex ante defined categories resulting from preliminary considerations based on the already existing knowledge about the object of investigation form the beginning (Gläser and Laudel 2019, pp. 7–9). But in accordance to some others as well, the qualitative content analysis as set out by Gläser and Laudel (2019) takes the principle of 'openness' into account. The use of opened categorization systems is necessary to explain causal mechanisms. It allows to add new or enhance existing categories if relevant information arises unexpectedly from the data which does not fit into the predefined system. This guarantees that theoretical presuppositions serve the knowledge process and not vice versa – an indispensable precondition to find an answer about an existing knowledge vacuum (Gläser and Laudel 2019, pp. 10–11).

Irrespective of such hedging measures, as every methodology the chosen research path shows some considerable limitations. First of all, in general single-case studies are usually non-transferable. The findings resulting from a context-dependent case study is only cautiously applicable beyond their clearly defined theoretical framework. In turn, an over-generalisation of findings must be avoided (Patton 1999, pp. 1197–1198). Meaning, the extractive qualitative content analysis applied in an institutional-oriented framework of urban governance settings can provide insights if and how a mechanism of collective actions is working. For the present thesis this means to show if and under which conditions *Save Kvity Ukrainy* as a participative and collective mechanism of civic action is able to protect architectural heritage of Soviet modernism in Kyiv. If this is true for Kyiv, then perhaps with respect to the geographical focus present in this thesis, collective actions can show the same effect in other post-communist urban settings and potentially shape institutions in

⁹ Author's note: As there is a wide range of literature on qualitative content analysis with authors promoting different interpretations of the term, this thesis follows Gläser and Laudel's definition (2019, p. 7).

urban governance even beyond the issue of architectural heritage protection. But the mechanism-oriented strategy can neither provide a reliable answer about the general adequacy of collective actions as a mechanism influencing and shaping urban governance settings worldwide nor define any globally valid norms or necessary preconditions. Moreover, the demanded openness of qualitative content analysis finds its natural limits in the minimum theoretical understanding of the research object, which has to be previously given in order to be able to find the sought answer (cf. Patton 1999, pp. 1197–1198).

Similarly, a hardly preventable risk is the imminent danger of being misinformed by interview partners respectively that information is withheld and not being shared to the full possible extent. This might happen intentionally or unintentionally. But in any case, it is not unlikely since the source of information is subjectively conditioned and to a certain degree every human individual always acts subjectively. This threat can be minimised as good as possible by using interview protocols and following the interview guidelines as happened in the course of collecting data for this thesis (cf. Patton 1999, pp. 1190–1192). Last but not least, and for the present.

The interviews followed a semi-structured guideline based on Döringer's (2020) approach of the 'problem-centred expert interview', developed and already proven itself as suitable for the field of urban studies. As depicted in *Table 1*, one guideline for each type of actor interviewed, therefore 'civil society', 'citizen' and political actor, was operationalised with respect to the research question and the imperative to translate the abstract research variables and categories into a terminology understandable for everyone. By this means, all actors interviewed faced the same guideline and the pitfall of working for could be minimized. To adhere to the principle of openness if new findings were influencing the knowledge production, the guideline was slightly adjusted (cf. Gläser and Laudel 2019).

The guidelines begin with an open introductory question, giving the interview partner the opportunity to build up his own narrative concerning the situation around the *Kvity Ukrainy* pavilion. For the follow-up questions, the guideline then followed a semi-structured systemization. This allowed to react flexible on the interview course and, where needed, skip questions or react spontaneously with additional questions, where a mentioned aspect demanded further detailed inquiry (see *Table 1*, cf. Döringer 2020, pp. 271–272). The leading questions for all interview partners were tailored and structured depending on their institutional backgrounds according to Pierre's (2014) urban governance framework. Therefore, the two questionnaire categories 'Relationships in Kyiv's urban setting' and 'Save *Kvity Ukrainy*' embeddedness in the civil society' were introduced. With regard to the pitfalls and potentials of collective actions to protect Kyiv's architectural heritage of Soviet modernism, the category 'Long-time perspective' reflects Rydin and Pennington (2000) collective action problem in urban settings (see *Table 1*; cf. Silver et al. 2010, ch. 2).

Table 8 – Structure of interview guidelines applied for each interviewee type by categories

Urban governance actors in Kyiv's historical architectural landscape			
Questionnaire categories	Activists participating in collective actions	Institutional actors from the public sector	Citizens
Relationships in Kyiv's urban setting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential nexus between Euromaidan and increased civic engagement; - development of Kyiv's real estate market since independency; - potential understanding among Kyiv's city administration for collective actions and their concerns; - relationship to private real estate developers; - relationship between private real estate developers and Kyiv's public sector; - potential understanding among Kyiv's city administration and private developers for value of Soviet modernism architecture beyond pure economic factors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential nexus between Euromaidan and increased civic engagement; - development of Kyiv's real estate market since independency; - potential legislative and administrative shortcomings with regard to sustainable urban planning and the preservation of architectural heritage and public urban space in Kyiv and Ukraine; - relationship to private real estate developers; - relationship to civic movements aiming at the preservation of architectural heritage in Kyiv. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential nexus between Euromaidan and increased civic engagement; - contact with Kyiv's real estate market; - perception of Kyiv's real estate market; - relationship between private real estate developers and Kyiv's public sector; - potential understanding among Kyiv's city administration and private developers for value of Soviet modernism architecture beyond pure economic factors.
<i>Save Kvity Ukrainy's</i> embeddedness in the civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ukrainian society's perception of heritage of Soviet modernism architecture; - biggest obstacles to achieve commitment for collective actions in Kyiv; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Knowledge about <i>Save Kvity Ukrainy</i>; - Ukrainian society's perception of heritage of Soviet modernism architecture; - potential contribution of the preservation of Soviet modernism architecture to the benefit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Knowledge about <i>Save Kvity Ukrainy</i>; - Ukrainian society's perception of heritage of Soviet modernism architecture; - perception of civic movements aiming at preservation of Soviet modernism architecture;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "prototypical" citizen, actively or passively committing to collective actions in Kyiv. 	<p>of Kyiv's citizens and urban landscape (e.g. reutilization).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - potential own commitment to civic movements; - biggest obstacles to achieve commitment for collective actions in Kyiv; - "prototypical" citizen, actively or passively committing to collective actions in Kyiv.
<p>Long-term perspective of collective actions aiming at architectural heritage protection</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential of collective actions and solidarity movements to replace or partly make up for capacity gaps in the public sector; - potential of collective actions contributing to a level playing field between the public sector, private real estate business developers and the civil society; - nature of the <i>Save Kvity Ukrainy</i> movement: driven by emotional feelings or following a clear strategy, beyond preserving the pavilion in its current abandoned status (e.g., questions of future use, energy efficiency); - potential strategies to sustain as a collective movement beyond its initial goal, therefore the preservation of the <i>Kvity Ukrainy</i> pavilion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential of civic movements to participate in and co-shape urban policy; - potential contribution of the preservation of Soviet modernism architecture to the benefit of Kyiv's citizens and urban landscape (e.g. reutilization). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential of collective actions contributing to a level playing field between the public sector, private real estate business developers and the civil society.

(Own table)

The in total four interviews were conducted remotely in Ukrainian or Russian language between September and November 2021. While unsurprisingly representatives defined as civil society actors were entirely willing to get interviewed, representatives from public authorities showed less cooperativeness. From the part of civic society one active and one non-active citizen have been interviewed. It was by far more difficult to convince representatives from public authorities to participate in the research via interviews although they were easy to identify by publicly accessible sources. From this side finally two interview partners in have agreed to an interview. Additionally, they rejected face to-face interviews and preferred to answer the semi-structured open questionnaires in written form. As already mentioned, planned interviews with representatives from the real estate sector as these ignored requests constantly. Regarding their role within the applied urban governance framework and the case of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, I had solely to rely on publicly available sources as well as third party statements from interview partners.

5. Putting empirical findings in context: how collective actions shape and do not shape a post-communist city in transition

By determining its assumed position as a grass-root movement of solidarity and collective action at the intersection of the social and urban post-communist transition, it is also possible to understand *Save Kvity Ukrainy*'s role as an actor within Pierre's (2014) urban governance framework (cf. ch. 2). Based on its position and role as an actor of urban governance, in a second step, by analysing expert as well as grey literature along with the empirical findings made through interviews, it will be possible to trace back constraints and potentials of *Save Kvity Ukrainy* to shape its environment.

5.1 Entangling relationships in a post-communist Kyiv urban landscape

According to Smith (2015, p. 221), with regard to urban conservation, the 2011 *UNESCO Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape* brings a new 'ecological' dimension into play. From this perspective, the introduction of an 'environmental' dimension represents the final logical step in completing the triangle of 'urban conservation' in the context of 'urban development'. Supposedly this triangle, besides the environmental dimension, consists of the 'contemporary' respectively 'development' dimension and the 'heritage conservation' perspective. The triangle should be a milestone as it breaks up the rigid understanding of architectural heritage protection as being simply an issue of remembrance and aestheticism (Smith 2015, p. 221).

But reminding one about the specifics of transition in post-communist cities, it can and must be questioned in how far at all the dimensions of heritage conservation and urban development have been already sufficiently part of urban governance in Kyiv. This question leads straight forward to a second question inherent to the theoretical framework underlying the case study: How Kyiv's urban governance setting as one in post-communist transition look like and how its actors involved in the sphere of urban development relate to each other (cf. ch. 1). May it be as real-estate developers, public institutions, regulating the sector, or other actors sharing the aim to preserve Kyiv's urban landscape, such as *Save Kvity Ukrainy*.

5.1.1 *Actors of urban governance in Kyiv's real-estate sector*

For this thesis fundamental role of two actors in Kyiv's urban governance structures can be explained by reminding one about the question asked at the beginning of this chapter. It is one of how these two actors perceive the city's urban landscape in how far they respect the dimensions of heritage conservation and urban development, according to Smith's (2015) proclamation.

To date, Kyiv's development sector is largely affected by a phenomenon common for many towns and cities in the post-communist transition, the people in Ukraine, Russia and other post-Soviet states coined the term '*reyderstvo*' (from engl. "to raid") (cf. e.g., Cybriwsky 2016). In the real state sector¹⁰, the term describes the illegal take-over of building land or existing properties through businessmen and other investors with close ties to politics and public authorities, locally as well as on the national level. To make things happen, a typical mean is the initiation of legal proceedings like tax fraud, building code violations, unpaid customs levies based on falsified evidences via the misuse of corrupt courts. The ultimate aim of such undertakings always remains the same: to expropriate the lawful owner, and might it be even the state, of what belongs to him. Alone in Kyiv one can find numerous cases where people and institutions were expropriated of their homes and public spaces were taken over by 'raiders' and so withdrawn from common use (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 58–59). Deriving its name from its habit, according to Pierre (2014), 'raiders' as a special type of private real-estate developers, typical for post-soviet urban settings in transition, can be identified as the first actor of urban governance this.

The second main factor is the public sector, constituting state institutions and individuals serving them. Individuals of major importance for the present thesis and belonging to this actor group were already introduced indirectly with the case study of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*. As became obvious here as well as in most other cases of collective anti-development actions (cf. Cybriwsky 2016), these are mainly members of the Ukrainian national parliament Verkhovna Rada, the KCC or judges, and state attorneys (cf. ch. 3).

Unfortunately, taking into consideration the events around the *Kvity Ukrainy* pavilion and the modus operandi of raiders in Kyiv's commercial real-estate sector, the public sector obviously lacks a sufficient approach to the city's architectural heritage. Not to speak of a common perception of its urban landscape. And *Kvity Ukrainy* is neither the first, not an isolated case where this lack of by the public sector is evident. The case of *Hostynnyi Dvir* is another one supporting this view. The *Hostynnyi Dvir*, translatable as "The Welcome Courtyard" respectively "The Hosting Place", construction in the early 19th century is rich in

¹⁰ Author's note: *Reyderstvo* also appears in other sectors, for example, where state companies or private businesses are taking-over by means of illegal practices (see e.g., Rojansky 2014).

history. Initially being home to a trading hall for merchants from abroad, until 2012, it hosted a bank, the V. H. Zabolotnyi Government Library of Architecture and Construction, a cosmetic and beauty salon, cafes, and other small-scale businesses. The heritage inherent to the building also contains non-visible attributes, among them pogroms against Jewish traders which took place there in 1905 and its utilization as a movie set for contemporary films. In 2011, the KCC issued the allowance to *reconstruct* the building to a development company, while *reconstructing* meant the conversion into an office centre and shopping mall, reminding one about roots of the conflict around the Kvity Ukrainy building (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 304–307).

The disregard and ignorance of the city's architectural heritage, although out of a diverging intrinsic motivation, common to both actors of urban governance, the public sector as well as private real-estate developers, has been deplored by experts for a long time already. As Kyiv architectural historian Mykhailo Kalnytskyi it has put it once applicable: "The Bolsheviks destroyed many things for the communist belief, and today people will destroy anything for money." (Kozmina 2000).

5.1.2 *Civil society as an actor of urban governance*

Having identified two of the three main urban governance actors, determining the fight over Kyiv's architectural heritage, know the third, collective actions in Kyiv, will be introduced against the background of its specific local genesis.

In the public discourse, the Euromaidan is often regarded as a turning point in Ukraine's history after which the civic engagement in the whole country reached a new peak (cf. e.g., Burlyuk and Shapovalova 2018). During interviews conducted, interview partners generally did not oppose this view, stating for example "[...] that after the Revolution of Dignity¹¹, public activity has significantly increased. [...] [Therefore,] citizens believed in their power to influence the change in the usual imperfect processes that by inertia took place in Ukraine from the moment of the declaration of independence to the Revolution of Dignity." (Case study interview 3, advisor to MoP from Kyiv) And indeed, indubitable this strengthened belief of the civil society in its own influence has shaped Kyiv's urban governance setting significantly, too. Accordingly, especially "[...] the demand for high-quality urban services, comfortable public transport, high-quality public spaces, etc. has increased." (Case study interview 3).

¹¹ Author's note: The term 'Revolution of Dignity' in its meaning is synonymous to the one of 'Euromaidan' and refers to the same course of events with its centre in Kyiv but taking place all over Ukraine between November 2013 and February 2014.

But despite the widely shared interpretation of the Euromaidan as a general turning point for participative citizen engagement in Ukraine, the history of neighbourhood protests against real estate development projects in Kyiv has a longer history than often supposed. It can even be traced back to Soviet times, before one could have thought of a future post-communist transition in Kyiv at all. Little is known for instance what happened during the city's preparation for the 1980 Olympics as a co-host: Residents and citizens protested against that around 700 buildings, some of them their home, some of the historical value, were teared off (Cybriwsky 2016, p. 293). Over time and the different periods of communism and the post-communist transition, such protests never stopped. Alone between October 2009 and September 2010, in total, 278 anti-development protests took place nationwide, making up for 10.3 percent of all different types of civic protests taking place in Ukraine during that period. Around 45 of these anti-development protests occurred in Kyiv (*Tsentr Doslidzennya Suspilstva* – CEDOS 2011). Amongst others, one popular incident the long-lasting collective protests against the construction of a multi-storey office complex at the site of a small square above the Teatralna metro station which served the public as a leisure ground in Kyiv's city centre at Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho street (see e.g., Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 60–65). Interview partners, not being confronted with these numbers, indirectly confirmed these findings, saying that “[...] before this revolution, there were [already] several more revolutions on the Maidan. [...] Although they were not as decisive and important as this one, but is already happening.” (Case study interview 4, Kyiv citizen). The concurring statement of another interview partner agrees in “[...] that there have always been people who participated in social and political processes.” But as the same interview partner added, “[...] it was after the Revolution of Dignity that the quality and motivation of these movements changed qualitatively.” (Case study interview 3).

From the literature research and interviews conducted for this thesis it can be derived that during the time of post-communist transition, active civil society¹² has become a more and more present actor in the field of architectural protection. Further, it can be argued here that the events shortly before and afterwards of the Euromaidan mark a key point after which collective actions become more professionalized and institutionalized. But in any case, it should be also noted that already since communist times, Kyiv's active part of civil society has been, albeit to different degrees, a recognizable actor of urban governance. And as such, weather successfully or not, from the beginning it has utilized collective and participative actions. In this sense, *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, although being a very

¹² Author's note: Naturally, as in most settings also Kyiv's civil society is diverse. And especially the part of it inactive and rejecting to participate in collective actions objecting to protect its urban landscape, although theoretically profiteering from those, is a second focus of this thesis. To better distinguish this part of civil society from the one already actively participating in collective actions, for my thesis I introduce the terms 'active' and 'inactive' civil society, respectively.

recent one, can be characterized as one of many examples following a long-standing tradition of collective actions to protect the city's urban heritage (see Table 2, cf. Cybriwsky 2016, p. 299).

5.1.3 *Collective actions and interactions in Kyiv's urban landscape*

After the identification of actors of urban governance, pivotal for the fate of architectural heritage in Kyiv, now their actions and interactions can be localised within Sýkora and Bouzarovski's (2012) model of the multiple post-communist urban transition.

Asked about the relationship between Kyiv's active part of civil society and the city authorities within these structures, one founding member of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, assessed it as "existent" but "[...] fragile, as shown by different cases that relate to different problems of the city." Just to continue saying that "until the city authorities become aware about a problem like a rally, some big scuffle in the city, they rarely pay attention to city problems." (Case study interview 1, active member of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*).

As every quotation, this statement can be interpreted differently. It could be derived from this statement that the city's authorities see the in the language of Ukrainian activists so-called '*aktsii*' (cf. Cybriwsky 2016), therefore collective actions such as rallies and marches, as problematic. Alternatively, it can be interpreted in that way that without such immediate actions of civil society, pressuring issues of urban transition in Kyiv remain neglected and ignored. Ultimately, it can also mean a mix of both interpretations. But certainly, the statement gives hint that the relationship between both actors seem to be of a somewhat one-way nature with actors of Kyiv's civil society being constantly in the need to attract awareness for their concerns.

The statement of an Ukrainian MoP, probably more thinking of himself as an ordinary citizen when asked about his perception about the relationship between the public sector and the part of civil society active in issues of urban development, seems to support this impression: According to himself he is "[...] an occasional Instagram follower, protest attendee, money donator, but certainly not the most involved person out there" (Case study interview 2, MoP and Kyiv citizen). This statement is very interesting in a twofold manner. In the first place, it demonstrates that actors in Kiyv's urban governance can take over multiple, possible non-complementary, roles. And secondly, the statement already embraces probable field of activities where the collective actions of the civil societies can attract increased participation (cf. ch. 5.2).

Picking up the first type of information this statement contains and putting it into context of the complaints about lacking support through the public sector by the former interview partner. But how do the public sector and private real-estate developers interact

with each other? Is the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion only an inglorious though isolated case? Or does their entanglement follow an established pattern? Remembering the case of Hostynnyi Dvir, by comparing the course of events with those around *Kvity Ukrainy* unveils similar patterns, also known from other incidents. Following the permission for deterioration, entrance to the courtyard inside the Hostynnyi Dvir was banned and it became subsequently an informal garbage dump. On 15 August 2011, by decree No. 1380, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine took Hostynnyi Dvir from the list of historically registered landmarks. This happened after the city administration had already transferred the property rights to the building including the allowance for deterioration to a company, 91% owned by the Cyprus-based Afridreko Holdings, Ltd. Despite of its name *Ukrrestavratsiia* (engl. "Ukraine Restoration"), the company with obviously valuable relationships to national and local politics was allowed to fulfil its plans to convert the building into an office centre and shopping mall (cf. ch. 5.5.1). The first collective protests started already shortly after the decree has been issued. On 26 May 2012 the plans were published, but its terms were not shared in any way and remained a secret. The same day unknown people broke in the courtyard and activists of collective movements *Zberezhy Staryi Kyiv* (engl. "Save Old Kyiv") and *Pravo na Misto* (engl. "The Right to the City"), other groups as well as individuals gathered around *Hostynnyi Dvir*. They started with spontaneous concerts and discussions, and poetry slams. In the course of these developments, subsequently they came to the decision to do not leave the ground and proclaimed the *Hostynnyi Dvir Republic* (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 307–308).

The decisive group of collective activists behind the *Hostynnyi Dvir Republic* began to rotationally staying over night on the site, while freeing it from the trash having accumulated since its cordoning off. Other actions included the appropriate disposal of the garbage, an urban gardening project in the courtyard, open to all citizens, and the re-activation of the abandoned café in form of an art gallery. To guarantee the further inclusion of Kyiv's citizens a diverse program for the public was established. This included the panel discussions about Kyiv's history, culture and architecture, regular concerts, Russian and Ukrainian language lessons, movie nights, picnics, workshops for children, and even more (Cybriwsky 2016, p. 308).

To enable this all, a list with some few general rules and a daily to do-list was set up. In parallel, activists took opportunity of their existing communication channels to outreach to their urban environment, inform, found raise and seek for broader support, beyond their original community. The outreach was positively replied by many and the activists received besides monetary support also food donations, voluntary labour force and material needed for their collective action. All this went on for nearly a year until in the night from 8 to 9 February 2013, a fire, breaking out on the second floor and damaging the roof

and many rooms substantially. When calling the fire department for help, the activists claimed, they replied conspicuously late. Finally, they arrived but did not seem to be ambitious at all to extinguish the fire and some witnesses said the firefighters were not appropriately equipped. The true background of the fire could never be clarified. But the behaviour of fire department and what happened afterwards gave all the more the reason to be suspicious about it (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 308, 309).

Even not retreating from the fire, what finally put an end to their collective project was something we know too well from *Save Kivity Ukrainy* and numerous other collective attempts to protect architectural heritage from *reyderstvo*. (cf. ch. 3.3, Cybriwsky 2016, p. 59). Ten days after the fire, a huge group of unmarked men in black entered the site, beat up the activists just to turn them over to police. Everything what the activists had built up on the territory of the Hostynnyi Dvir was removed. The entrance was locked up again and around the site an opaque hoarding was erected (Cybriwsky 2016, p. 309). The fate of the Hostynnyi Dvir though remains undecided until today and so far, nor office and shopping complex has been built in the left facade skeleton.

The methods applied go even beyond these pure power imbalances aiming at individuals personally. During the research for this thesis the activists of *Save Kivity Ukrainy* lounged a Facebook post, inviting for an online meeting on 20 December 2021. The post called for legal and public support for Taras Hrytsiuk. Hrytsiuk was obviously sued by the owner of the Kivity Ukrainy pavilion of giving false information in an interview with the popular Ukrainian TV Channel 1+1, allegedly damaging the developer's business reputation. (*Save Kivity Ukrainy* 2021d, cf. ch. 3.3).

Other incidents discovered as part of this research included the public vilification of activists such as Iryna Fedoriv and through websites containing fake background information on the person to be humiliated (Flash on Time News n.y.; RedAxe n.y.). In 2012, so before the Euromaidan, Iryna Fedoriv, a journalist and activist of *Rukh Chesno* (engl. "Honest Movement"), started to raise questions about the suspicious development plans for common land in the Bilychanskyi Forest near Kotsiubynske at Kyiv's western borders. Developers planned to turn the land into building plots, worth around USD 2 billion. Following threatening phone calls, she and her family had to hide from public, and whereas in 2104 the forest was put under conservation status, her public humiliation continued. Her fellow campaigner, Olha Matiushyna, fighting for an administrative integration of the Kotsiubynske village in Kyiv's administrative borders was also object to public vilification. Both their campaigns were lounged by Kotsiubynske deputies in order to avoid the administrative integration of Kotsiubynske (Vynogradova et al. 2020, pp. 30–31; Cybriwsky 2016, p. 294).

What happened to the collective actions of *Hostynnyi Dvir Republic*, *Save Kvity Ukrainy* and other activists occurs not only regularly. Much more, it can be characterised as making up for a large part of interactions between the public sector, commercially driven real estate-developers and collective activists with the aim to beware Kyiv's urban heritage. The especially inglorious relationships between the first two actors leads to a large imbalance in Kyiv's urban governance setting in favour of real estate-developers which can act often without any restraints. They fall not only back on money to corrupt courts or the physical forces of thug squads, but often make use of existing personal and familiar power relationships between the sector and real-estate sector. This also possible in form of a dual role where both sectors reunite within an individual person or its or family. A phenomenon very typical for post-Soviet oligarchic dynasties (see e.g., Cybriwsky 2016, p. 59).

Statements from the active civil society, public sector as well as citizens interviewed about their triangular relationships seem to affirm this situation. At best they assess the relationship between real estate-developers and the public sector in a neutral way, interestingly among them one *Save Kvity Ukrainy* activist. The activist complained that allegedly the "[...] the relationship between the developer and the city administration does not exist since the city authorities are not involved in the process at this level. They neither solve the problem nor stay on the side-lines and do not give any comments." (Case study interview 1). However, one citizen not being member of any collective movement in Kyiv expresses himself in a much more direct way. The citizen described the local development sector as "[...] very chaotic, unpredictable and corrupt [...]", though admitting "[...]" that it is difficult to build transparent relations with the state in any area." (Case study interview 4) He was also convinced, that:

"if they need a modern building and it will be cheaper, they will definitely [...] [build] it without hesitation. In Ukraine, the rules do not work in this regard, so I am convinced that no one will take into account the historical facts in this regard."

In his perception he was supported by other interview partners, who went more into detail about what this means for the relationship of actors involved. Although himself describing himself as a non-expert in the field of urban legislation and administration, being qua profession very familiar with the Ukrainian politico-economic landscape. For him, in respect of sustainable urban planning and the preservation of both architectural heritage and public urban space in Kyiv, "[...] it feels like money is still the king, and whoever has more dictates the rules." (Case study interview 2) An interview partner, working in an advisory role to a MoP, very active in the events around *Kvity Ukrainy*, said that despite ongoing reforms of urban development laws in the country "[...] Kiev, as the capital of Ukraine, is guided by a

different law "On the capital", and we have the [...] situation, when city administrators are trying to carry out an unsustainable and corrupt [though alternative to the official] master plan for implementation." (Case study interview 3). On the other hand, it is also that the administrative planning tools, besides being applied by corrupt authorities, follow a strict top-down approach. They do not foresee any kind of participate mechanisms at all leaving room to citizens to articulate its needs and demands to a sustainable urban planning (Case study interview 3).

For the interview partner himself and the MoP the person is advising, it was claimed that they have no direct connection with the development companies. Nonetheless, they would try to interact with such companies on behalf of residents who alert them about new constructions raising questions legality. Still, according to the interview partner, the private entrepreneurs are often reluctant to response to their inquiries by making false statements about the legitimacy of their undertakings. In such cases, the advisor said, they would send relevant inquiries to the responsible government agencies to clarify the situation, so that if illegal actions are confirmed, the community has more evidence to start legal proceedings. About the success rate of these inquiries send to the responsible authorities the person asked could or did not want to name statistics (Case study interview 3).

As a result, the empirical findings support the literature saying that not only experts in questions of urban development, the needs of citizens, and even the laws of the state are ousted (see e.g., Cybriwsky 2016, p. 59). This makes it difficult for collective actions operating in this field to succeed due to constant personal threat. Ironically, these collective actions are then all the more needed as they represent a counterpoint to this situation. And in this respect, the situation of urban transition in Kyiv, although unquestionable being a milestone in Ukrainian history in many ways, has not so much changed pre-and after-Euromaidan as often assumed. This is in particular visible by comparing the nature of events around the pre-Euromaidan collective action around Hostynnyi Dvir and those of after-Euromaidan *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, which show a high degree of similarities. And also, the timeline around the Fedoriv-case crosses those of the Revolution of Dignity.

This somewhat in-between reflects itself also within Sýkora and Bouzarovski's (2012) model of the multiple post-communist urban transition: The situation seems more or less to stuck between the second transition stage of 'social transformation', characterised by internationalisation, social polarization and postmodern culture and the third transition phase of the actual 'urban transformation' with city centre commercialization as well as inner city regeneration. The urban governance actors such as (international) investors and developers as well as movements of collective actions and the causes of their confrontation (social polarization), and in case of the civic society also their nature (postmodern culture), are rooted in the second transition phase. While their aims of city centre commercialization

respectively inner-city regeneration are already part of the third stage (cf. Fig. 1). What can be said for Kyiv, and probably for many cities worldwide, when applying the proposed theoretical framework proposed (cf. ch. 2), that the city's urban governance setting is remarkably imbalanced between the active and not-active civil society on one hand and the public as well as private development sector on the other.

5.2 Development and future of Save *Kvity Ukrainy* as an actor of collective action in Kyiv's urban transition

So far, the roots and nature of the still developing *Save Kvity Ukrainy* collective movement have been explored. Adjuvant, the position and situation of collective actions aiming on the protection of architectural and urban heritage in Kyiv's urban governance network have been determined. But which potential implications have the answers to both questions for the future of the *Save Kvity Ukrainy* collective movement in particular and the preservation efforts of (modernist) architecture in Kyiv in general? To fathom out these implications, in the present chapter the empirical and non-empirical findings made in the two chapters before will be merged, especially in terms of the potentials and pitfalls in terms of mobilizing the civil society.

5.2.1 The costs of a constant fight or the issue of sustaining support

Following Rydin and Pennington (2000), for an individual the decision to refuse from participating in collective actions has often rational reasons. And there can be many such rational reasons, often coinciding in their causes for existence. For the situation of collective movements in Kyiv, not necessarily aiming at the preservation of architectural heritage, it was already assumed upfront before conducting the empirical research that the 'costs of participation' are potentially an essential factor (cf. Rydin and Pennington 2000, cf. ch. 1, 2.3.1). And indeed, as one interview partner framed it:

"I am not sure that all activists will have enough resources and strength to do this for a very long time, constant involvement takes a lot of time and the search for financial support for the existence of the movement."

(Case study interview 1)

What further becomes evident here, is that, at least for the collective actions of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, the factor *time* decisively impinges on the costs of participation. A circumstance which is well-known from many cases of civic engagements and participation around the

world, and most likely plays a major role in most of the many other collective other in Kyiv, too (cf. Silver et al. 2010).

Interestingly, the interview partner defined *time* as the main costs of participation. Going further into detail of the statement, *time* contains what should be here named the *direct* and *direct* costs of participation. In this sense, the *indirect* costs could be defined as the 'resources' and 'strength' (Case study interview 1), which everyone who is personally committed to a collective movement has to muster. While what can be termed as *direct* costs is then understood as the costs a collective movement itself has to muster.¹³ The direct costs include foremost, as already said in the statement, financial support, for example in the application for grants. Other resources, probably especially essential for collective movements aiming on the protection of architectural heritage in Kyiv, might be in-kind donations, like repairing and gardening tools, or costly legal support. The need for in-kind and legal resources were not mentioned by the activists of *Save Kvity Ukrainy* during the interviews. Both are known from the example of the libel suit against Taras Hrytsiuk or other collective movements with similar backgrounds like *Hostynnyi Dvir Republic* (*Save Kvity Ukrainy* 2021d, Cybriwsky 2016, p. 308, cf. ch. 5.1.3).

For Kyiv's collective movements, the economic numbers support the assumption made by the interview partner, who is undoubtedly an insider, that time and resources are decisive in form of a limiting factor towards more participation. According to statistics, in 2017 the average length of a working year in Ukraine is about 1990 hours. This would place Ukraine in the top seventh in comparison to 35 other OECD-member states and is nearly 33 % more than in Germany (1136 working hours per year). (Ekonomichna Pravda 2018). In conclusion, it is likely that a large part of Kyiv's population has simply not enough time and monetary resources to participate in collective actions, even if willingly to do so.

The will, as mentioned just above, is an important aspect worth investigating with regard to the 'direct benefits of participation' and 'costs of non-participation'. As the direct benefits of participation have a direct influence on the motivation to participate in collective actions for an individual (cf. Rydin & Pennington 2000), at first it needs to be determined what should be the benefit. Theoretically, the benefit of collective actions like *the Hostynnyi Dvir Republic*, *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, and *Savekyivmodernism* and many more is a partial preservation of Kyiv's architectural heritage, for the latter two they with a special focus on Soviet modernism (cf. Table 2) But what if this theoretical benefit is not recognised as such by most of potential supporters and participants of these collective actions? What, if they

¹³ Author's note: Self-evidently, the attribution of what are *indirect* and what are the *direct* costs of participation can be also the other way around and depends on the object of research. But because the focus of the present research is on the constraints, limit and potentials of collective movements, the costs they have to burden are here defines as *direct*. The costs for individuals in their role as citizens and of which the collective movement consists of is then accordingly defined as *indirect*.

do not recognize Soviet modernism as belonging to their own urban landscape and heritage, worth to protect (cf. ch. 3.2)? Are they then sufficiently motivated to invest resources through participation in collective actions?

It might be as there is slow but constant shift which citizens interviewed apparently saw when comparing the situation as it is now to a few years ago. At that time, allegedly much less people, if at all, paid attention to the bad condition of Soviet modernist architecture or the need to protect architectural heritage. But now, in his view, the relatively recent collective movements to preserve modernist architecture in Kyiv are already yielding positive results (Case study interview 2, 4). And obviously, the potential benefits can be also quite pragmatic, even when the subject of interest, here Soviet modernism, is of much more non-visible potential value than of practical, and correspondingly one which is highly emotional loaded. In his own opinion the interviewee added also a quite pragmatic aspect about the potential value of modernist architecture when stating that the country should accumulate its heritage rather than destroy it every 30 years (Case study interview 4).

Though there is a shift, there is also definitely a significant share of Ukraine's society disregarding the architectural or historical value of Soviet modernist architecture (see e.g., Manucharian 2021; *Rynok vyrishyt?*; 2021; Stoffers 2020; ICOMOS 2016, cf. ch. 3.2). One interviewee described that the approach to Soviet modernism is one of currently high controversy due to the inherent communist heritage and against the background of the going decommunization in the country (Case study interview 3). At the frontline of this polarization the same person identifies three contractional types of views: The first type sees nothing valuable in architectural heritage of Soviet modernism and consequently wants to see it replaced. Apparently, representatives of these connect it to a Russian heritage, unwelcome in Ukraine at these times. The second type is sceptical too, though out of more pragmatism reasons. For them, buildings of Soviet modernism have mostly exceeded their life span and are therefore should be replaced with something more modern and commercially viable. This opinion is the one mostly expressed by developers but also many architects. The third group eventually takes a position of preservation. Intellectuals, activists, and scientists make up for the biggest share of this third type. But also, architects, either those who are still living and were responsible for the constructions of the modernist architecture or of a younger generation valuing the building from an aesthetic perspective (Case study interview 2, 3, cf. ICOMOS 2016, ch. 3.2).

Summarizing, it seems as the preservation of Soviet modernist architecture is more of concern to an urban bohemian world and politically active younger generation than a broader society. One interview partner, personally believing in the possibility to re-utilize Soviet modernist architecture for the common good and also positively speaking about Savekyivmodernism and its pro bono concept for the Tarilka building, even questioned the

existence of Ukrainian society in this sense. This person ascribed such collective actions to activists acting out of idealistic reasons or those of younger generations being only recently mobilized by Instagram accounts like *Save Ukrainian Modernism* (Case study interview 2).

Drawing conclusions from these statements made, it is very likely that the costs and benefits of participation for many individuals are simply too high respectively too low to rationally justify personal engagement in such an idealistic matter like the preservation of architectural heritage. Not at least because for individuals participating in collective actions to protect architectural heritage in Kyiv, the danger of being sued by developers as shown by the fate of *Save Kivity Ukrainy* member Taras Hrytsiuk is real (*Save Kivity Ukrainy* 2021d, cf. ch. 5.1.3). The existing threat of being forced to invest time and other individual resources besides in collective actions itself also in legal disputes has a potential negative affect on what Rydin and Pennington (2000) call the 'expected distribution of costs and benefits associated with the policy outcome' co-determining the rational ignorance.

Further, the potential outcomes of protecting architectural heritage are connected to, at first glance, rather idealistic motives, and, as it concerns Soviet modernism architecture, do not awaken positive emotions among all potential participants. Statements of interviewees confirmed these assumptions (e.g., case study interview 4). With regard to their attitude towards Soviet modernist architecture, one interviewee ascribed three categories to Ukrainian citizens, according to whose opinion either "[...] we must get rid of [it due to the inherent Soviet legacy] [...]", "the function of these buildings has [...] outlived, is obsolete and [...] can [be] easily [...] [replaced by a] new one which will be more modern and commercially viable [...]", or "[...] it is necessary to preserve [...] [its] legacy [...]" (Case study interview 3).

At least in the view of the first two groups, in case of being successful in their endeavour of preserving Soviet modernism architecture, collective actions like *Save Kivity Ukrainy* most likely do not hold any benefits which they would pay the costs for. It does not seem to be an overly unrealistic assumption that this has a potentially dissuasive effect on passive sympathisers from actively engaging in collective actions, especially those aiming at the preservation of Soviet modernism. And it might be a valid explanation why many of Kyiv's citizens do not pay too much attentions too these issues (cf. Cybriwsky 2016, p. 292). Especially, as the costs of non-participation are existent but more in the indirect kind of untapped potential when it comes to the preservation of Soviet modernism architecture. A good example for this is the until now unrealised concept for the overhaul of the Tarilka building developed by activist's pro-bono (cf. ch. 3.3.1). Instead it seems much easier to gain participation in collective actions for the preservation of urban historical landscapes which have been already proven their benefit to the common good and are threatened of construction by developers. A good example is the attempted preservation of the small

square above the Teatralna Metro station, which hold on for in total eight years from 2003 to 2011 from the first announcement until the illegal realization of the development project at its site. Alone in the end of 2009 3,000 citizens signed a petition against that the park should give way for just another redundant office commercial office complex (see Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 61–62, Table 2, cf. ch. 5.1.2).

The untapped potential of existing opportunities to re-utilize architectural heritage of Soviet modernism to the common benefit leads to another prime mover affecting the rational ignorance of citizens: ‘the level of knowledge of the issue and the process’ (Rydin and Pennington 2000). According to one interviewer, in his opinion the collective action of Savekyivmodernism is a quite sophisticated, high-level approach, for now only earning a niche existence and being largely ignored by Kyiv citizens and the new owner of the building (cf. case study interview 3). Indeed, hosting an academic institution and later a number of events such as the Kyiv Biennale, the Tarilka building probably did not address the Kiev population in its entire breadth but more a somewhat educated urban class of people.

Interestingly, despite these very high costs and barriers of participation and, in the view of average citizens, obviously too low benefits, interviewees strongly emphasized the importance of collective actions in urban landscape and heritage preservation. Interviewees mentioned generally their capability to steer urban political processes into certain directions by inter alia stimulating public debates (e.g., case study interview 3, 4) or as one depicted that “if it wasn’t for them, Kyiv would turn into one giant plastic Kiosk.” (case study interview 2) Among positive case examples mentioned was the restoration of Soviet mosaics of Ada Rybachuk and Volodymyr Melnychenko where an agreement was reached, since the new owner of the building saw the value of combining modern architecture with mosaics (case study interview 3, cf. Table 2).

Also, Kyiv’s main coach station Tsentralnyi Avtovokzal and the renovation in line with monument regulations in the course of the opening of the completion of the Dytiachyi Svit shopping mall (engl. Children’s World) was named. According to interview statements, in the latter case, after the announcement of the new project, a public discussion took place leading to requirements for the developer to preserve the facades and hold an architectural competition. Finally, the owner agreed to a public meeting and held a transparent competition, and just the other day the winning project was published (case study interview 3).

5.2.2 How weakness in resources can be an inclusionary advantage

The perception of Soviet modernism architecture among Ukrainians, outlined in the chapter before, reveals an interesting intersection to the two crossroads of the collective action

problem contributed by Silver et al. (2010): 'exclusion versus inclusion' and 'confrontation versus consensus'. Therefore, the central question might be: how to include people and harness them for one own's collective actions, if they do not share one own's values and goals or simply have other priorities in face of their difficult socio-economic situation?

Coming back to the case example of *Save Kvity Ukrainy* interview partners familiar with the situation due to their professional background estimated the core of the initiative to consist of four to five people. Allegedly, these are neighbourhood residents, the daughter of the of the designing architect of the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion, Mykola Levchuk, and the already mentioned Taras Hrytsiuk, historian, local resident engaged in the preservation of urban landscape heritage not only here, but since a long time in the city (case study interview 3). This does not speak for a great integrative and participative charisma among actors in Kyiv's urban setting and especially not among residents. It can further lead to the conclusion that the groups one and two of citizens as distinguished in chapter 5.2.1 based on conducted interviews and those who have simply different priorities and therefore an indifferent attitude towards *Save Kvity Ukrainy* is potentially substantial (cf. ch. 5.2.1). On the other hand, a huge media echo accompanying the *Save Kvity Ukrainy* case, the following collective action *Marsh za Kyiv*, co-organised by *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, and lively ongoing debate about Kyiv's urban development, landscape heritage and the role of Soviet modernism in this very one, at least partially kept fired by these events, points into another direction. Here, a large passive participation can be identified. With passive participation it is meant that these citizens share the values and values of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, without being an active core member of the movement itself. It might be that they were part of the larger groups of Kyiv citizens who occupied the Kvity Ukrainy pavilion or attended the *Mach for Kyiv*, but do not actively push forward for an institutionalisation of *Save Kvity Ukrainy* as actor of urban governance in the city's setting. And the for the time being partial success is hardly imaginable without the support of large-scale passive participation. Not that a legal system, known as notoriously corrupt, ruled in favour of the collective movement when it ordered a stop of the construction activities. And even with a premiere when referring to an infringement of non-property copyrights of an architect (cf. ch. 3.3.1, case study interview 1).

The ambiguity of low participative charisma along with a high passive participation seems to be shared by *Save Kvity Ukrainy* with many of the collective movements and actions aiming on the preservation of Kyiv's urban landscape. And this regardless of whether they aim at the architectural heritage of Soviet modernism or other objects (cf. Table 2). This suggests two assumptions: First of all, that these collective movements in Kyiv as actors of urban governance in conflict with the public sector and private can utilize a lot of social capital (cf. Rydin and Pennington 2000). Based on Coleman (1988, p. 98),

Rydin and Pennington (2000, p. 161) define social capital as the pre-existing set of immaterial equipment and tools on which an actor can fall back to build up visions or strategies. The social capital is rooted in the – in this case urban – social setting in which an actor is imbedded and without it could not achieve its aims. Of all types of social capital as defined by Rydin and Pennington (2000, p. 161) it seems that *Save Kvity Ukrainy* and the other collective movements being analysed here concomitantly are especially rich of the following ‘the extent of networks between individuals and groups’, ‘the density of relationships within networks’, ‘local knowledge’, ‘the level of trust between individuals and groups’, and ‘norms of routine behaviour’.

In turn, they seem poor of ‘effective sanctions to punish free-riding’ (Rydin and Pennington 2000, p. 161). Still, the objective to preserve architectural and urban landscape heritage is a very idealistic one where more, even passive, participation means more leverage and the opportunities for gaining individual material benefits is low. Hence, in this specific case the absence of mechanisms to punish free-riding might be even a strength, although by Rydin and Pennington (2000) originally understood as shortcoming. Coherently, it can be assumed that the intensive for real-estate developers as competing urban governance actors hijack and steer these collective movements and actions to their own benefit is similarly low as they are already in the traditionally stronger position. However, it can be doubted whether this underdog role is a strength rather than simply the status quo since the beginning of post-communist transformation in Kyiv (cf. Silver et al. 2010, ch. 2).

The second assumption is that the most inclusive driver for collective actions and movements in Kyiv engaging themselves in issues of urban space is a general great dissatisfaction with the situation among citizens. Given the large number of collective movements and actions identified during this research and the wide range of different types of urban landscape they aim to preserve further supports this assumption (see Table 2). The existing threat to single puzzle pieces of the urban landscape such as the architecture of Soviet modernism though, might be more the concern of a niche group of urban intellectuals. Though, this can be also a strength if all these collective actions and movements are able to join forces under a common roof and develop sustainable integrative forces out of the general dissatisfaction.

A step in this direction might be the *Marsh za Kyiv*. The March was originally organized as one-time collective action by 46 non-governmental organizations, grass-roots initiatives, public research institutions, think tanks, and ongoing petitions addressing ecologic and urban development issues. By unifying these collective movements, it’s aim was to strengthen their integrative forces by providing a platform for all Kyivans who share the organizers’ values and are similar unsatisfied with the ecologic situation in their city and

how urban policy is made here. One interview partner, belonging to the key circle of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, stated that by creating this platform they hope it will be possible to maintain their motivation and energy. The interviewee explicitly emphasized the challenging high participation costs when harmonizing their collective actions with their private lives as entrepreneurs, employees and family members. (case study interview 1; Matveichuk 2021, cf. ch. 3.3.2). Thereby they want to avoid the fate of so many collective actions before, meaning simply fading out silently and eventually landing in a dead.

But not leaving it at that, the March for Kyiv led to a quite tangible result: the *Green Book of Kyivans* (Green Book). The book features 35 demands divided in five areas of priority to make the city a more inclusive urban landscape worth living for all citizens. The demands include an immediate public transport and mobility reform, introducing an extensive system for monitoring water and air quality as well as the modernization of treatment facilities including the abandoning of chlorine water purification. Further, it is demanded to stop the unplanned and uncontrolled development of the city by setting up a new master plan in an open international competition and replacing the KGP. The participation of residents should become mandatory in all planning processes in the city, and the development of urban planning documentation be granted to the competitive bidder. On a broader level, the Verkhovna Rada should finally return Kyiv administrative rights and stop political interference in local self-government in Kyiv (*Marsh za Kyiv* 2021).

Table 9 – Selection of collective movements and actions in Kyiv aiming at urban heritage preservation from 2000s to 2020ies

Collective movement/ action	Targets of action	Status	Comments
Andriivs'kyi Uzviz	One: Kyiv's main historical street Andriivs'kyi Uzviz	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consensus-oriented collective movement; - existent and active in social media (e.g., Facebook). 	Advocates for an urban planning aiming at the protection and preservation of historical monuments and architecture at the Andriivs'kyi Uzviz.
ARWM Heritage	Multiple	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collective movement, falling back on repetitive collective actions; - existent. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collective movement dedicated to preserving the cultural heritage of Soviet modernism artists and architects Ada Rybachuk and Vladimir Melnichenko.
Hostynnyi Dvir Republic	One: Hostynnyi Dvir merchant hall	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One-time conflict-oriented collective action; - formed by several already existing collective movements and individual activists; - ceased to exist: no public activities after 18 February 2013. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On 26 May 2012 activists of collective movements <i>Zberezhy Staryi Kyiv</i> and <i>Pravo na Misto</i>, other groups occupied the building to preserve it from being reconstructed into a shopping mall/ office complex. - On 9 February 2013, a fire broke out in the Hostynnyi Dvir building, which destroyed the roof of the building, occupied by activists. The then chairman of the KCC Commission on Culture and Tourism, Oleksandr Bryhynets, claimed that the building was set on fire on purpose so that the developer could speed up the reconstruction. - On 18 February 2013, the building was stormed by anonymous men ambushed the activists out of the building and forced them out. Since then the movement ceased to exist.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - By end of 2021, the final fate of the abandoned Hostynnyi Dvir remains unknown/ -decided and its ruins are still visible in the Kyiv district of Podil. - In 2021, the urbanistic think tank <i>Urbanyna</i> published a pro-bono concept, how a future restauration of the building, benefiting all, could look like. <p>(cf. ch. 5)</p>
KPI Urban Squad	One: Campus of the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ongoing collective movement founded by KPI-students; - consensus-oriented; - existent with an own website - active member of <i>Marsh za Kyiv</i>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organising lectures and other events, engaging in education, interventions, research, analysis and project development; - Aiming at developing the KPI campus into a barrier-free and safe urban space and preserving its architectural heritage and push forward the city administration towards a sustainable urban policy.
<i>Mapa Renovatsii</i> (engl. "Renovation Map")	Multiple	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consensus-oriented ongoing collective movement; - existent with an own website and active in social media (e.g., Instagram, Twitter, Facebook). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Platform for cooperation between private business, civil society, and the government to preserve and revive architectural heritage in Kyiv; - Maintains its own website including an interactive map depicting hot issues of urban planning and architecture in Kyiv; - <i>Mapa Renovatsii</i> team provided advisory and legal support to the activists of <i>Save Kivity Ukrainy</i> right at the beginning of their actions, before they formed their own collective movement.
<i>Marsh Za Kyiv</i> (engl. "March for Kyiv")	Multiple	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ongoing collective action; - formed by several already existing collective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For 2 October 2021, 46 non-governmental organizations, grass-roots initiatives, public research institutions, think tanks, and ongoing petitions addressing ecologic and urban development issues, organized

		<p>movements and individual activists;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - hybrid between conflict and consensus; - existent. 	<p>this collective action, demanding their rights as citizens and to make Kyiv a better place to live to the benefit of all;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As result the “The Green Book of the Kyivans was published, in which all participating organizations formulated their demands and suggestions to realize their goals. <p>(cf. ch. 3.3.2)</p>
<p>Pravo na Misto (engl. “The Right to the City”)</p>	Multiple	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conflict-oriented collective movement; - being part of several collective actions to preserve Kyiv’s architectural heritage; - ceased to exist as far as known the author: no current (social) media activities or recent public actions could have been identified. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The initiative was created to bring activists and Kyiv citizens together who want to co-determine what their city will be like. - Was part of the activist coalition which formed the <i>Hostynnyi Dvir Republic</i> collective action. <p>(cf. ch. 5)</p>
<p>Sadyba Barbana – Vriatuimo Observatornu 6 (engl. “Sadyba Barbana – Let’s beware the Observatory 6”)</p>	One: Sadyba Barbana Observatory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ongoing collective action; - existent and active in social media (e.g., Facebook). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Movement of residents who want to preserve the historical building of the Sadyba Barbana observatory; - the initiative group organizes actions, communicates with deputies, informs the public about the building, sends inquiries and appeals to achieve conservation status for the estate.
<p>Savekyivmodernism</p>	One: Tarilka (eng. “Plate”) building, hosting the Ukrainian Institute of Scientific and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ongoing consensus-oriented collective movement; - existent and active in social media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collective movement of architects, designers, activists and residents of Kyiv to protect the architectural objects of Soviet modernism in Kyiv;

	<p>Technical Expertise and Information</p>	<p>(e.g., Instagram, own website. Facebook);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - active member of <i>Marsh za Kyiv</i>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - developed a pro-bono concept for a contemporary re-utilization of the Tarilka building. <p>(cf. ch. 3.3.1)</p>
<p>SaveKinopanorama</p>	<p>Two: Cinemas 'Kino Panorama' and 'Kino Ukrayina'</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One-time conflict-oriented collective action; - ceased to exist as far as known the author: no social media activities or public actions since October 2018. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Filmmakers, city residents, and public figures formed a collective action including a petition, signed by 10,000 people, to protect two cinemas, the 'Kino Panorama' cinema and the 'Kino Ukrayina' from closure, destruction, and redevelopment. - 'Kino Panorama' and 'Kino Ukrayina' were privatized in 2008 respectively 2005 following a decision by the KCC. - The owner of 'Kino Panorama' claimed it to be unprofitable in its current state and wants to convert it in to a renewed complex, probably hosting a cinema, too. - 'Kino Ukrayina' was bought by a new, still unknown, owner and as by now, no plans for its overhaul have been shared with the public. - Built in 1958, 'Kinopanorama' is unique in its architectural and acoustic properties. The cinema was as the first experimental panoramic cinema. It has constantly become one of the venues for various film festivals and screenings of arthouse cinema, having unique film projection equipment. - Built in in 1964 the style of Soviet modernism, 'Kino Ukrayina' is a site of cultural architectural heritage and a symbol for the search for an Ukrainian identity: on 4 September 4 1965 peaceful protests against the repression of the Ukrainian intelligentsia by Soviet authorities took place here, just before the premiere of the film "Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors", directed by Serhii Paradzhanov.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - By end of 2021, both cinemas are closed and the final fate of buildings, still existing in their original design, remains unclear. <p>(cf. ch. 6)</p>
Save Kvity Ukrainy	One: <i>Kvity Ukrainy</i> pavilion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ongoing conflict-oriented collective action; - existent and active in social media (e.g., Facebook, YouTube). - active member of <i>Marsh za Kyiv</i>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public initiative to preserve <i>the Kvity Ukrainy</i> pavilion; - interacting with many other civic movements in Kyiv, e.g., as co-organizer of the 'Marsh za Kyiv'; - 4-5 active key members; - receiving support from Kyivan MoP. <p>(cf. ch. 3)</p>
Save Kyiv	One (as far as known to the author): Square serving as public leisure ground above Teatralna Metro station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Non-successful collective action; - conflict-oriented; - ceased to exist, sources found only in specialist literature (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 60–63). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Between 2003 and 2011 activists of Save Kyiv and neighbors protested in the end unsuccessful against the erection of a new multi-story office building at the site of the square at 7 Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho street; - activists made use of collective actions as demonstrations and theatre-performances featuring caricatures of corrupt developers and city officials; - in 2009 a petition against the development project was signed by 3,000 citizens; - besides the Cabinet of Ministers, the head of Kyiv city administration, and the KCC demanded a construction stop due to its localization in Kyiv's historical centre and applying heritage protection laws, the chief architect of Kyiv announced the dismantling of the construction crane, several courts ruled the project being illegal, and public metro operator's safety concerns, the project was realized;

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - as results of the protests the city administration announced, the newly constructed building would serve as new home to the Museum of the History of the City of Kyiv, which has been ousted from its home by actions of <i>reyderstvo</i> just before; - as by 2016, rumours said, the building is still property of the original developer Alliance-Center, Ltd. Which rents it to the city, paid by tax money. <p>(cf. ch. 5.2,1)</p>
Ukrainian Modernism	Multiple	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collective movement, falling back on repetitive collective actions; - existent and active in social media (e.g., Instagram); - active member of <i>Marsh za Kyiv</i>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Online catalogue of Ukrainian modernist architecture that supports activists and collective movements in the preservation of Ukrainian modernist architecture.
<i>Vriatui Zhovten</i> (engl. "Save Zhovten")	One: 'Zhovten Kino'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collective action, successfully demanding the restauration of the modernist Zhovten building, while maintaining its original purpose as cinema; - First conflict-, later consensus-oriented; - existent and active in social media (e.g., Instagram, Facebook); - active member of <i>Marsh za Kyiv</i>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On 29 October 2014 an arson attack was committed on Zhovten cinema in the Podil neighbourhood; - Zhovten cinema is an arthouse-cinema, hosting exhibitions and festivals, showing an LGBT-related film, at the time, the fore was set; - following these events, local activists formed <i>Vriatui Zhovten</i> and successfully convinced city authorities to supporting them in rebuilding the cinema instead of privatizing it; - after the restoration of the Zhovten cinema, the movement still engages for an integrative, citizen-friendly, urban planning and interacts with other actors to save Kyiv's architectural heritage.

<p>Zberezhy Staryi Kyiv (engl. "Save Old Kyiv")</p>	<p>Multiple</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - conflict-oriented collective movement; - being part of several collective actions to preserve Kyiv's architectural heritage; - as far as known the author for now only active through (social) media as a public Facebook group, where everybody can share observed threats to urban landscape (own website is down, c. Cybriwsky 2016, p. 299). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The collective movement was formed in September 2007, protesting successfully against an envisaged construction of a skyscraper at site of the protected green zone Peizazhna Aleia (engl. "Landscape Lane"); - it proceeded with its activities to oppose the absent/ chaotic urban development in Kyiv and to preserve endangered Kyiv's endangered architectural heritage. - Published on their (phased out) website an interactive map, showing all current cases of endangered architectural heritage in Kyiv. - Was part of the activist coalition which formed the <i>Hostynnyi Dvir Republic</i> collective action. <p>(cf. ch. 5)</p>
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(Own table, based on: own sources and information; KPI Urban Squad 2021; Mapa Renovatsii 2021, NGO Andriivs'kyi Uzviz 2021; NGO Stop Nezakonna Zabudova 2021; Sadyba Barbana 2021; Savekyivmodernism 2021; Ukrainianmodernism 2021; Urbanyna 2021; Vriatui Zhovten 2021a; Zberezhy Staryi Kyiv 2021; Khenhistov 2019; Interfax-Ukraine 2018; Zakusylo and Hryhorenko 2018; Collison 2017; Cybriwsky 2016; Svoboda 2013)

5.2.3 Excluding conflict by including consensus or how both determines each other vice versa

During their collective action the activists of the *Hostynnyi Dvir Republic* reached out to their urban setting, by claiming that they do not refuse a restoration and conversion of the building and admitting its bad shape. What they demanded was simply that it would be done in a transparent way and in line with heritage protection laws. And that not, like already so often witnessed, that only the facades of the *Hostynnyi Dvir* would be integrated into a completely new building to circumvent existing rules and regulations (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 308– 309). The message could be understood as both: an act to increase inclusiveness of one's own collective actions, but also to avoid confrontation and seek for consensus. In this, how the

questions of exclusion versus inclusion respectively confrontation versus consensus are intersecting ones (cf. ch. 2.3.2, 2.3.3).

When it comes to of the 16 collective movements and actions, aiming at the preservation of Kyiv's urban landscape and architectural heritage and identified in the course of the present research, only four of them seem to be strictly consensus-oriented from the beginning (cf. Table 2). By analysing their social media activities and public actions known to the author from own experiences, *Andriivs'kyi Uzviz*, *Mapa Renovatsii*, KPI¹⁴ Urban Squad and *Savekyivmodernism* can be counted to these. The background and character of these consensus-oriented collective actions and movements and actions is quite diverse. While for example *Mapa Renovatsii* has does not only inform the public thorough its interactive map and online portal, depicting current burning issues of urban heritage protection, it goes already a step further. By trying to find investors providing sustainable development concepts, considering conservational aspects, for these, often abandoned, objects, *Mapa Renovatsii* reaches out to an actor in Kyiv's urban governance setting, often perceived as antagonists. Interestingly, although the concept is quite sophisticated and shows significant parallels to a modern start-up (e.g., an own lawyer is part of the team), their website presence is only available in Ukrainian. This might be also interpreted as intentionally to promote inclusion among Ukrainians and create a new investment culture in the city and country itself (*Mapa Renovatsii* 2021; Khenhistov 2019).

In the case of the NGO *Andriivs'kyi Uzviz* as well as the KPI Urban Squad, it can be argued that inclusion is the only viable strategy¹⁵ (*Andriivs'kyi Uzviz* 2021; KPI Urban Squad 2021). As it concerns the collective action of *Andriivs'kyi Uzviz*, caring for a citizen friendly development of the Kyiv's main historical street and tourist attraction of the same name, it is most likely that choosing conflict-oriented strategy would lead to a dead end and no acceptance on the side of the public sector. The target of their actions simply is of too high importance also for the other actors of governance in Kyiv's urban setting and gains to much attention. Similarly, it is hard to believe that the KPI Urban Squad, founded as a collective movement by students of the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) and targeting at a student-friendly, barrier-free, campus, has the means to achieve its objectives by confrontations with the university and city authorities (KPI Urban Squad 2021).

Those collective actions choosing the part of conflict at least at the beginning of their formation and during their first actions show also significant parallels. First of all, they mostly form themselves as one-time collective actions around one concrete object of urban

¹⁴ Author's note: from Natsionalnyi Tekhnichniy Universytet "Kyivskii Politekhnichniy Instytut imeni Ihoria Sikorskoho"/ engl. National Technical University of Ukraine "Ihor Sikorskyi Kyivan Polytechnic Institute (KPI).

¹⁵ Author's note: Still, to answer this question to full extend, further research is needed, which goes beyond the aim of the present work.

landscape heritage where conflict with public authorities and private developers ignites (e.g., Panorama and Zhovten cinemas, Kvity Ukrainy, Teatralna Square or *Hostynnyi Dvir*). Some of them then developed further into longer-lasting collective movements with the aim to protect more threatened objects of urban heritage. Or in turn, where demand appears, existing collective movements are then part of a founding coalition to form a new collective one-time action respectively give support and advice, e.g. through legal competences (cf. ch. 3.3, Table 2). Secondly, for all of them the interim conclusion is rather sobering. Of the seven collective actions and movements identified as part of this research and which can be clearly classified as conflict-oriented, only *Vriatui Zhovten* succeeded in preserving the *Zhovten* cinema in both, its architecture and function. Very interesting is also that of all things this, at the beginning conflict-oriented, collective action turned onto a consensus-oriented path shortly after its formation. *Vriatui Zhovten* successful sought for broad civic support pushing for a solution which would prefer keeping the building in its original function as a cinema with its original architecture over selling its remnants to a private developer. In the end public authorities including Kyiv's major Vitalii Klitchko gave in to the protests and agreed to support the activists of *Vriatui Zhovten* financially and with men power and further needed resources (Collins 2017, pp. 35–36). But the support of the city authorities is never guaranteed and seems to follow quite erratic patterns as the example of Kino Panorama and the *Hostynnyi Dvir Republic* show. Both collective actions gained, just as *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, too, public support form representatives of Kyiv's city parliament or MoPs (Zakusylo and Hryhorenko 2018; Svoboda 2013). Nevertheless, in both cases this did not help them to achieve their goals.

Similar erratic seems the choice by some of the individuals steering these collective actions preferring finally a consensus-orientated path over conflict. A defining example of this is the person of Ihor Lutsenko. Becoming also a prominent figure later on during the Euromaidan, already at that time being one of the core members of *Save Old Kyiv*, he played key role during the days of the *Hostynnyi Dvir Republic*. Here, also later Kyiv major and then oppositional MoP Vitalii Klitchko became victim of a tear gas attack by the police when he made his appearance accompanied by television teams (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 308 – 309, 331) Eventually, the paths of both actors would cross again, when Ihor Lutsenko would take the opportunity as an adviser to Vitalii Klitchko, then already major of Kyiv (Ukrainska Pravda 2019). This is quite astonishing, considering that Kyiv's major has from the author's own experience and knowledge a quite bad reputation with regard to the preservation of Kyiv's urban heritage. A perception which was also shared by interviewees during the author's research. For example, one of them complained how "[...] disgusting [it] is that the Mayor didn't say anything of essence about it [*Kvity Ukrainy* pavilion] and activists are still all there is to hope for." (case study interview 2).

Indeed, as the legal procedure is still ongoing, the future will show what will be the final destiny of the *Kvity Ukrainy* pavilion. Similar as for the Tarilka building and the *Hostynnyi Dvir*, architects already came up with own pro-bono drafts for the restoration preserving the buildings original structure of the *Kvity Ukrainy* pavilion (Krutko 2021; Savekyivmodernism 2021; Urbanyna 2021). Besides that, committing to *Marsh za Kyiv* and co-elaborating the Green Book could be a step towards more consensus-orientation. Thereby probably the fate of *Hostynnyi Dvir* or *Kino Panorama* as collective actions *asleep*, still awaiting concrete results, can be avoided. But also, the power to push the other urban governance actors towards more collaboration and generating more inclusiveness is probably easier to reach through the joined forces of the *Marsh za Kyiv*.

Interviewees spoke also for a in the long run more consensus-oriented approach of collective actions protecting urban and architectural heritage in Kyiv. One interviewee stated that many representatives of the movements are already engaged in advocacy for urban reforms and could become politicians or specialists, adding their competencies to a further urban transformation. However, according to the same person so far it seems that the presence of such movements is outwardly of the system and stimulates the public sector and private developers to be more open and accountable through conflict (case study interview 3).

That conflict remains at least for now and partially part of collective movements and actions in Kyiv is also likely due to two other circumstances: Firstly, one should remember the cost of non-participation as part of the rational ignorance. But this time from the perspective of the other actors of urban governance active in Kyiv, and here especially private developers. It is it cannot be denied that the ignorance of the activists seldomly costs them anything. When the conflict about the square above the *Teatralna* Metro station broke out, insiders claimed, the developer, though being called by the court to stop the construction work, could simply continuing with his project. And this because in reality he did not face any consequences of his illegal doing. Even more, he would have been compensated for any demolition and clean-up work, necessary as result of the civic protests (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 62–63). The belief, that public authorities and private developers could afford to ignore any consensus-oriented suggestions such as pro-bono restoration drafts was also shared during interviews (e.g., case study interview 2).

The other circumstance is the real threat that conflict is also brought in from the outside. From the collective action of *Vriatui Zhovten* it is known that the arson attack on the cinema was carried out by far-right *activists*, whereas the backers remained in the dark (Collins 2017, pp. 35–36). Interview partners reported similar things about the events *Kvity Ukrainy* and *Marsh za Kyiv*. According to them, during the time of the occupation many graffiti with corresponding messages appeared at the *Kvity Ukrainy* pavilion and the

attendees of the Marsh for Kyiv were hassled by a group of decommunization-activists (case study interview 2). This comes on top to the already discussed individual threat of being sued by raiders and consequently convicted or becoming victim of launched public humiliation campaigns (cf. ch. 5.2.1).

6. Concluding remarks

Before putting the findings made into context against the background of the research question and the underlying hypothesis, as part of a short recap, I will refer to some fundamentals which have been emerged in the course of my research. First of all, it should be obvious that this research cannot provide a full understanding of all aspects, drivers and dynamics, determining the actions and interactions of urban governance actors with respect to urban landscape preservation and how they influence Kyiv's urban transformation. Not least because for such an ambitious plan, the sample size of qualitative research undertaken would have to be widened substantially and also actors from the private development sector must have been interviewed. An intention which was already part of the present research, but remained a fruitless endeavour.

Nevertheless, what the present thesis can provide as a secondary outcome, is a valuable depiction of the diverse landscape of collective actions and movements aiming at the preservation of urban and architectural heritage in Kyiv since the beginning of this century. An outcome that can be considered very valuable for further potential research.

Before discussing going deeper into the findings, it needs to be stated that *Save Kivity Ukrainy* and many of the actors moving in the same environment can be not only classified as collective actions or movements. This was done here in particular for the purpose of the underlying theoretical framework. But as explained by the example of *Mapa Renovatsii* some of them apply quite sophisticated methods and ideas, similar to start-ups, while some remain quite simply structured in their actions (cf. Table 2). But all of them are definitely part of a dynamic grass-root movement and can be partly, following Brown and Ashman (1996), classified as NGOs. For Brown and Ashman (1996, p. 1476) the way how social capital is being used defines if a structure of civic engagement can be characterized as a grass-root movement or NGO. This means that grass-root movements primarily fall back on "[...] mobilising local resources and information [...]" to achieve their goals and for which they need constant engagement from local communities (Brown and Ashman 1996, p. 1476). A fact which definitely applies to *Save Kyiv Ukrainy* and *Marsh za Kyiv* and many other collective movements protecting urban heritage in Kyiv. Contrary, according to (Brown and Ashman 1996, p. 1476), NGOs serve as mediators between donors, government agencies, and grassroots movements. Based on this distinction, one thing becomes evident: Just as Kyiv underlies an ongoing, 30-year lasting and still incomplete urban post-communist transformation, the transitional status applies also to many collective movements, with taking an intermediate position between a grass-root movement and an NGO. *Save Kivity*

Ukrainy and its evolution from a neighbourhood movement to being one of the co-organizers of the *Marsh za Kyiv* and co-authors of the Green Book is a prime example of this. They fall back on the same social capital as grassroots movements and live from the constant engagement of a small group of core members, but also serve already through the March for Kyiv as a mediator on a broader network (cf. ch. 5.2.2).

Coherently, the danger of becoming a NIMBY can be considered as marginal, not only for *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, but nearly for all the collective movements and actions introduced here. This is foremost because they fight for and not against something which is imposed from outside. The *for* is more participative rights in the preservation of their architectural heritage going along with a more citizen-friendly environment.

As hypothesized upfront, the most apparent constraint to encourage community members to participate in the analysed collective actions and movements is the rational ignorance fuelled by constantly high participation costs in the form of *time, energy, finance* and other resources engagement. Interesting is that in consequence of the unequal power distribution between the relevant urban governance actors in Kyiv's urban setting, the low cost of non-participation for the public sector and developers and raiders can be considered as a similar decisive limiting factor for civic participation (cf. ch. 5). It can be assumed, that the dead-end in which some of the collective movements and actions are stuck can be traced back to the absence of effective sanctions and therefore cost for non-participation for these urban governance actors. As a result, the objects these collective actions aim to preserve are often neither torn down or repurposed as originally foreseen by the developer nor given to an alternative purpose for the benefit of all. Prime example for such imperfect collective actions is *Hostynnyi Dvir Republic* or *Save Kino Panorama*. The before assumed special position of the architectural heritage of Soviet modernism could have been only partially confirmed. Yes, it seems that its attempted perseveration by collective movements potentially gains the attention of more counterforces than only greedy developers and corrupt city officials, also violent ones. But many buildings from other architectural periods like the *Hostynnyi Dvir* are also under constant threat of *reydersto*.

What is more, a personal interpretation of the findings is that the role of the Revolution of Dignity as a turning point for civic engagement in Kyiv and as a whole in Ukraine might sometimes be a bit overemphasized. No doubt, it was a turning point in many ways, and civic engagement reached a quantity and quality never witnessed before in the city. This was also confirmed throughout all interviews conducted. But with regard to the protection of urban landscapes and architectural heritage, there have been large collective movements already before the Euromaidan (cf. Table 2).

But what are the lessons learned from the findings? The characteristic pin-point nature shared by most collective actions and movements in Kyiv indicates a too narrow

focus for many of them (see Table 2, cf. ch. 5.2.3). This might be useful in case of a collective action looking right from its beginning for consensus. Then it can be assumed that this guarantees the collective action the necessary calm environment where it can work towards the fulfilment of their mission. But for those which are caught in the vicious cycle above (cf. ch. 5.2.3, Table 2) a broader focus following a cycle of contestation and consensus (cf. Silver et al. 2010) while joining forces with the many like-minded collective movements would be probably more promising. The *Marsh za Kyiv* and the consecutive publishing of the Green Book seems to be a first step in the right direction.

What is already promising is that for many of the objects of architectural heritage in question experts such as architects and urban planners among the activists developed pro-bono restoration and repurposing concepts. This is even more promising as the activists of Kyiv's urban setting in post-communist transition seem relatively open to cooperate with the private sector. Something what distinguishes collective actions in Kyiv and probably also in other post-communist countries in ECE from their counterparts in many Western countries (Cybriwsky 2016, pp. 308–309, cf. Kalandides and Vaiou 2016, ch. 5.2.3). Cooperation of this kind, flanked by public support measurements and initiatives, could be a starting point for a sustainable restoration of Kyiv's architectural and urban landscape heritage.

What is missing to use this potential is effective leverage to increase the costs of non-participations for the other urban governance actors, namely developers and the public sector. For this, the legal environment in Kyiv with regard to urban planning needs to be stabilized and reformed in favour of all of the actors in Kyiv's urban setting and not only further deepen the sinister relationships between the public sector and raiding developers. This includes explicitly a reform of the only recently reformed KGP. The reform should also consider the increase of district councils as by now, only 120 deputies should represent the interest of all 3 million Kyivans (Ponomorova et al. 2020, case study interview 1).

It makes the impression as collective movements and actions in Kyiv gaining becoming constantly more numerous and are transforming themselves constantly, but in different directions. Some of them choosing the path of conflict, some of the consensus, and some take hybrid forms. Correspondingly diverse are the ideas, strategies and means with some of them, like Savekyivmodernism or *Mapa Renovatsii*, even falling back on quite professional methods. This gives hope that and this is the everlasting pre-condition, the constitutional state shows similar improvements, they can succeed sustainably in their ambition to preserve Kyiv's urban landscape and its architectural heritage. Or as one interviewee got to the point:

“Things feel like moving towards a more civilised state ever since, but the pace is too slow and who knows how many more “Kvity” will we lose before getting to a boring state where one doesn’t need to be an activist anymore to protect the city’s soul and history.”

(case study interview 2)

A core member of *Save Kvity Ukrainy* stated that in the aftermath of the events around the building they were contacted by like-minded collective movements all over the country asking for advice how they can protect the heritage in their cities. Among them activists from Odessa, defending a theatre. The interaction between these initiatives nationwide and not only in their local urban setting is another continuation which seems worth of further research.

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Fig. 7 – Activists of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, attending the ‘Marsh za Kyiv’, holding a transparent saying “Do not destroy – Restore!”

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Table 2 – Selection of collective movements and actions in Kyiv aiming at urban heritage preservation in the 2010s and 2020ies

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Appendix I: Interview guidelines

I. **Semi-structured open interview guideline:** Activists participating in collective actions

Introductory question

“Often the Revolution of Dignity has been considered as a catalysator for actions of collectiveness and solidarity like *Save Kvity Ukrainy*. Would you agree?”

Interview questions

1. Relationships in Kyiv’s urban setting between city administration/public authorities, civil society actors and private/real estate business
 - How has Kyiv’s real estate market developed since the independency from the Soviet Union and have there been important milestones in your opinion which have changed the situation substantially?
 - Would you say, that there is a certain understanding among the city administration for initiatives like *Save Kvity Ukrainy*? For your concerns and reasons of existence?
 - How would you describe your relationship to the private/ real estate business and do you think, that the city authorities and the private/ real estate business have professional and transparent relationship between each other?
 - Do you think Kyiv’s public authorities and the private/ real estate business have an understanding for the potential value of Soviet modernism architecture beyond pure economic factors?
2. *Save Kvity Ukrainy*’s embeddedness in the civil society
 - How do you think, does Ukrainian society perceive the heritage of Soviet modernism architecture? Is there a lack of understanding for its value?
 - What are in your opinion/ experience the biggest obstacles to achieve commitment for your initiative/ movement/ idea from the civil society/Kyiv’s citizens?

- Would you say that there is something like the “prototypical” citizen, who: firstly, is open to engagement in collaborative and solidarity actions in general. And secondly, who is especially committed to your idea, values and movement?
- Is it possible to categorize citizens committed to *Save Kvity Ukrainy* and your values? As e.g., ‘passive supporter’, probably supporting your values but not actively engaging, ‘active supporter’, and so on?
- Would you consider yourself as a person, already committed to public actions and civil society before you have become an active member of *Save Kvity Ukrainy*?

3. Long-term perspective

- Can collective and solidarity actions like yours replace or partly take over administrative tasks of public authorities where they fail to fulfil them or simply do not have the necessary capacities?
- Can collective actions contribute to a level playing field between the city administration/ public authorities, civil society actors and private/ real estate business?
- Some experts and observers of urban development processes, not only in Ukraine but worldwide, tend to criticize that initiatives like yours are often driven by some kind of emotional feelings rather than a clear strategy. How would you assess *Save Kvity Ukrainy* with regard to this?
- Based on the question before, some experts also criticize that especially collective actions with the aim of protecting architectural heritage often do not sufficiently consider the common benefit of the respective object they aim to protect beyond its pure existence and do not consider potential negative effects of its preservation (e.g., questions of future use, energy efficiency). What is your position to this in general and with regard to *Save Kvity Ukrainy*?
- A well-known phenomenon of collective actions is that they often succeed with their initial goal, but afterwards fail to create a) an impact on a larger scale, let’s say in your case a change of how society as well as public authorities/ the state perceives and treats Soviet modernism architecture, and b) a continuous, sustainable form of civil society engagement. Do you have developed already ideas/ strategies to tackle both typical challenges for collective actions and do you think the recent

Marsh za Kyiv, which you have co-organized, is a first step to create a sustainable form of collective actions?

Follow-up question

“Would you consider yourself as a new type of collaborative and solidary movement? And do think, you can – respectively do you want – beware not only architectural heritage but also change something in society, like raising awareness for the importance of communist modernism heritage among Kyivian/Ukrainian citizens?”

II. Semi-structured open interview guideline: Institutional actors from the public sector

1. Relationships in Kyiv’s urban setting between city administration/ public authorities, civil society actors and private/ real estate business

- Often, the Revolution of Dignity has been considered as a catalysator for citizen movements in Ukraine, whose members/ followers have the aim to participate in public and political processes. Would you agree? Please explain why you agree/ you do not agree.
 - Have you heard about the citizen movement *Save Kvity Ukrainy* and if yes, what do you know about its background?
- How has Kyiv’s real estate market developed since the independency from the Soviet Union and have there been important milestones in your opinion which have changed the situation substantially?
 - Do you think that there are substantial legislative and administrative shortcomings with regard to sustainable urban planning and the preservation of both architectural heritage and public urban space in Kyiv and Ukraine?
 - If yes, can you shortly outline what these shortcomings are and why they, in your opinion, exist?
- How would you describe your/yours’s institution’s relationship to the private/ real estate business?

- How would you describe your relationship, those of your institution and Kyiv's city authorities to civil society actors/ citizen movements engaged in issues of urban development and policy in Kyiv in general and specially to *Save Kvity Ukrainy*, if you are/ your institution is in contact with them at all?

2. *Save Kvity Ukrainy's* embeddedness in the civil society

- How do you think does Ukrainian society perceive the heritage of Soviet modernism architecture?
- Do you think the preservation of Soviet modernism architecture, especially those not in use at the moment, can contribute to the benefit of all or at least a majority of Kyiv's citizens, e.g. through measures and concepts aiming at their economic or cultural reutilization open to all?
 - And if you think so, how can civil society actors/ citizen movements engaged in issues of urban development and policy in Kyiv contribute to the development of such concepts and measures?
 - Have you heard of an initiative named *Savekyivmodernism* and what do you think about their pro bono concept for a state-of-the-art reutilization of the *Tarilka* building, located at Kyiv's *Antonovycha Street*.

3. Long-term perspective

- Do you think that civil society actors/ citizen movements can play an important role in shaping Kyiv's urban policy, development and landscape, positively and/ or negatively?
 - Can civil society actors/ citizen movements partly replace or take over tasks of city authorities and/ or the private business?
 - Would you say that there is something like the "prototypical" citizen, who: firstly, is open to engagement in civil movements in general?
 - What are in your opinion/ experience the biggest obstacles for civil society actors/ citizen movements to achieve sustainable results and outcomes in the sphere of urban development and policy in Kyiv?

III. Semi-structured open interview guideline: citizens

Introductory question

“Often the Revolution of Dignity has been considered as a catalysator for civic action and engagement in Kyiv. Would you agree?”

Interview questions

1. Relationships in Kyiv’s urban setting between city administration/ public authorities, civil society actors and private/ real estate business

- Have you been involved in Kyiv’s real estate market as private person and/ or professionally? If yes, in way?
- How do you perceive Kyiv’s real estate market?
- Do you think, that city authorities and the private/ real estate business have a professional and transparent relationship between each other?
- Do you think Kyiv’s public authorities and the private/ real estate business have an understanding for the potential value of Soviet modernism architecture beyond pure economic factors?

2. *Save Kvity Ukrainy* embeddedness in the civil society

- What do you think about the heritage of Soviet modernism architecture in Kyiv and Ukraine?
- How do you think, Ukrainian society does perceive it?
- Do you think, there is a lack of understanding and value Soviet modernism architecture in Kyiv among civil society?
 - If yes, why do you think Kyiv’s citizens do not value Soviet modernism architecture?
- Do you think that Kyiv’s citizen should engage themselves more in civic actions and movements?

- What do you think about civic movements in Kyiv and especially those to protect architectural heritage
- Would you consider yourself as a person, active in Kyiv's civil society?
 - If yes, have you as a citizen already actively participated in civic engagement respectively do you still do?
 - If yes, how did/ does this civic engagement look like, what are/ were its aims, and what do you know about its roots?
 - If not, do you consider to participate in civic engagement in future and would you do it in civic movements aiming at the protection of Soviet modernist architecture?
 - If yes, in which situation would you participate in civic engagement?
- Have you heard about a civic movement called *Save Kvity Ukrainy*?
 - If yes, what do you know about it
 - Does it match with your personal values?
- What are in your opinion/ experience the biggest obstacles for Kyiv's citizens to become active in civic actions and movements?
- Would you say that there is something like the typical citizen, who: firstly, is open to engagement in civic actions and movements?

3. Long-term perspective

- Can collective actions contribute to a level playing field between the city administration/ public authorities, civil society actors and private/ real estate business?